Epstein Secrets

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

t, "[t]he contention that there is some inherent prejudice in joining perjury and related counts with substantive charges has been widely rejected." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791. And courts routinely hold that there is no prejudice where the evidence in support of the two counts is "interconnected." Blakney

r o f "underlying substantive crimes with perjury counts" is appropriate "where, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791; see also United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founde

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

t, "[t]he contention that there is some inherent prejudice in joining perjury and related counts with substantive charges has been widely rejected." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791. And courts routinely hold that there is no prejudice where the evidence in support of the two counts is "interconnected." Blakney

er of "underlying substantive crimes with perjury counts" is appropriate "where, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791; see also United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founde

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

t, "[t]he contention that there is some inherent prejudice in joining perjury and related counts with substantive charges has been widely rejected." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791. And courts routinely hold that there is no prejudice where the evidence in support of the two counts is "interconnected." Blakney

er of "underlying substantive crimes with perjury counts" is appropriate "where, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791; see also United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founde

influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was 121 EFTA00095213 addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards require the jury to determine whet

t, "[t]he contention that there is some inherent prejudice in joining perjury and related counts with substantive charges has been widely rejected." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791. And courts routinely hold that there is no prejudice where the evidence in support of the two counts is "interconnected." Blakney

er of "underlying substantive crimes with perjury counts" is appropriate "where, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791; see also United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In 142 EFTA00095234 Ruiz, the defendant was a New York stat

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

t, "[t]he contention that there is some inherent prejudice in joining perjury and related counts with substantive charges has been widely rejected." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791. And courts routinely hold that there is no prejudice where the evidence in support of the two counts is "interconnected." Blakney

er of "underlying substantive crimes with perjury counts" is appropriate "where, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791; see also United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founde