Epstein Secrets

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was 121 EFTA00095213 addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards require the jury to determine whet

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N. Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initi

grand jury that had issued a alliena for the production of documents as parl'of an ongoing ation5). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

Parties' reliance."). 79 EFTA00100046 cau PPIal (Id. washy a granrad issulaubeaurnalMI an In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martind ell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

her the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptionalcircumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification o fprotective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc