Epstein Secrets

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres