Epstein Secrets

case, the "answers associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support the perjury conviction." United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 808 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375). For instance, in Lighte, a case involving post-conviction appellate review, the

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question forpost hoc ambiguity,"Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable j

case, the "answers associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support the perjury conviction." United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 808 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375). For instance, in Lighte, a case involving post-conviction appellate review, the

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

case, the "answers associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support the perjury conviction." United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 808 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375). For instance, in Lighte, a case involving post-conviction appellate review, the

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

a case, the "answers associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support the perjury conviction." United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 808 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375). For instance, in Lighte, a case involving post-conviction appellate review, th

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

case, the "answers associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support the perjury conviction." United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 808 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375). For instance, in Lighte, a case involving post-conviction appellate review, the

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

nt's professed confusion now and proposed illogical reading of the questions in the instant motion does not render them fundamentally ambiguous. See Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221 ("A defense to a charge of perjury may not be established by isolating a statement from context, giving it in this manner a meani

ndication" to the defendant "as trustee"). The defendant's answers were unequivocal, with no expressions of confusion or internal contradictions. Cf Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 809 (explaining that a question was ambiguous as to whether it asked about the deponent's personal or professional capacities, in ligh