Epstein Secrets

y evaluate whether a question was fundamentally ambiguous only after the development of a full factual record at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 808 (2d Cir. 1992). The evidence at trial may shed further light on whether the questions posed were objectively ambiguous in contex

The balance of these considerations favors severance. "Motions to sever are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." United States v. Casarnento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1989). In its discretion, the Court concludes that trying the perjury counts separately will best ensure a fair and e

y evaluate whether a question was fundamentally ambiguous only after the development of a full factual record at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 808 (2d Cir. 1992). The evidence at trial may shed further light on whether the questions posed were objectively ambiguous in contex

The balance of these considerations favors severance. "Motions to sever are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." United States v. Casarnento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1989). In its discretion, the Court concludes that trying the perjury counts separately will best ensure a fair and e

y evaluate whether a question was fundamentally ambiguous only after the development of a full factual record at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 808 (2d Cir. 1992). The evidence at trial may shed further light on whether the questions posed were objectively ambiguous in contex

The balance of these considerations favors severance. "Motions to sever are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." United States v. Casarnento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1989). In its discretion, the Court concludes that trying the perjury counts separately will best ensure a fair and e