Epstein Secrets

34 to describe the window of when a violation occurred." United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp. 3d 364, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987)). "This is especially true in cases of sexual abuse of children: allegations of sexual abuse of underage victim

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

34 to describe the window of when a violation occurred." United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp. 3d 364, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987)). "This is especially true in cases of sexual abuse of children: allegations of sexual abuse of underage victim

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

34 to describe the window of when a violation occurred." United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp. 3d 364, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987)). "This is especially true in cases of sexual abuse of children: allegations of sexual abuse of underage victim

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury