Epstein Secrets

ury is best equipped 119 EFTA00100086 to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287,307 (2d Cir. 2018).47 A narrow exception arises when language in a question is so "fundamentally ambiguous" that a Court can conclude,

14(a). "[I]n order to prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

or sexual massages .. . you know?" had a clear meaning, and more important for purposes of the instant motion, any ambiguity was not "fundamental." Cl Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 237 F. App'x at 628 (concluding that an answer about "this arrangement" was not fundamentally ambiguous). Nor is there any basis to dismiss

ury is best equipped 119 EFTA00077751 to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).47 A narrow exception arises when language in a question is so "fundamentally ambiguous" that a Court can conclude

14(a). "[I]n order to prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

ual massages . . . [i]f you know?" had a clear meaning, and more important for purposes of the instant motion, any ambiguity was not "fundamental." Cl Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 237 F. App'x at 628 (concluding that an answer about "this arrangement" was not fundamentally ambiguous). Nor is there any basis to dismiss

ury is best equipped 119 EFTA00039566 to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).47 A narrow exception arises when language in a question is so "fundamentally ambiguous" that a Court can conclude

14(a). "[I]n order to prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

ual massages . . . [i]f you know?" had a clear meaning, and more important for purposes of the instant motion, any ambiguity was not "fundamental." Cl Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 237 F. App'x at 628 (concluding that an answer about "this arrangement" was not fundamentally ambiguous). Nor is there any basis to dismiss

jury is best equipped to determine the meaning that a defendant 119 EFTA00095211 assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).48 An exception arises when language in a question is "fundamentally ambiguous," that is "when it is not a phrase

o prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, 139 EFTA00095231 "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

nt. 124 EFTA00095216 you know?" had a clear meaning, and more important for purposes of the instant motion, any ambiguity was not "fundamental." Cl Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 237 F. App'x at 628 (concluding that an answer about "this arrangement" was not fundamentally ambiguous). Nor is there any basis to dismiss