Epstein Secrets

jury is best equipped to determine the meaning that a defendant 119 EFTA00095211 assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).48 An exception arises when language in a question is "fundamentally ambiguous," that is "when it is not a phrase

o prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, 139 EFTA00095231 "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

tain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the affidavit, (ii) "the alleged falsehoods or omissions were nece

irectly rebutting the defendant's allegations, there is no material issue of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing. The defendant cites Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to suggest that a hearing is somehow warranted, but her motion falls far short of the Franks standard to obtain a hearing. "W

ury is best equipped 119 EFTA00100086 to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287,307 (2d Cir. 2018).47 A narrow exception arises when language in a question is so "fundamentally ambiguous" that a Court can conclude,

14(a). "[I]n order to prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

tain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the affidavit, (ii) "the alleged falsehoods or omissions were nece

ury is best equipped 119 EFTA00077751 to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).47 A narrow exception arises when language in a question is so "fundamentally ambiguous" that a Court can conclude

14(a). "[I]n order to prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

tain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the affidavit, (ii) "the alleged falsehoods or omissions were nece

ury is best equipped 119 EFTA00039566 to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).47 A narrow exception arises when language in a question is so "fundamentally ambiguous" that a Court can conclude

14(a). "[I]n order to prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

tain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the affidavit, (ii) "the alleged falsehoods or omissions were nece

ury is best equipped 119 EFTA00103144 to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).47 A narrow exception arises when language in a question is so "fundamentally ambiguous" that a Court can conclude

14(a). "[I]n order to prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

tain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the affidavit, (ii) "the alleged falsehoods or omissions were nece

5, 6, 245 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 151 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 247, 249 United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183 (2d Cr. 2004) 208 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270 (2d Cr. 2018) 200, 201 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287 (2d Cir.

20 (2d Cir. 1928) 45 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) 140, 146 Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Assn, 396 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2005) 143 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) 166, 169, 170,171 Gatlo, 17 Cr. 686 (LAK) 275 Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) 125 Graham v. Co

5, 6, 245 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 151 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 247, 249 United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004) 208 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2018) 200, 201 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287 (2d Cir

(2d Cir. 1928) 45 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) 140, 146 Flagg v. Yonkers Say. & Loan Ass 'n, 396 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2005) 143 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) 166, 169, 170, 171 Gatto, 17 Cr. 686 (LAK) 275 Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) 125 Graham v. C

5, 6, 245 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 151 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 247, 249 United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004) 208 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2018) 200, 201 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287 (2d Cir

(2d Cir. 1928) 45 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) 140, 146 Flagg v. Yonkers Say. & Loan Ass 'n, 396 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2005) 143 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) 166, 169, 170, 171 Gatto, 17 Cr. 686 (LAK) 275 Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) 125 Graham v. C

5, 6, 245 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 151 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 247, 249 United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004) 208 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2018) 200, 201 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287 (2d Cir

(2d Cir. 1928) 45 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) 140, 146 Flagg v. Yonkers Say. & Loan Ass 'n, 396 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2005) 143 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) 166, 169, 170, 171 Gatto, 17 Cr. 686 (LAK) 275 Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) 125 Graham v. C