Epstein Secrets

overnment's arguments for exceptional circumstances and compelling need as relying on "the general desire for secrecy" and "unpersuasive" under the Martindell standard. (Id. at 6). Judge Netbum concluded that "the Government must demonstrate not that this investigation is an extraordinary circumstance, but

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

overnment's arguments for exceptional circumstances and compelling need as relying on "the general desire for secrecy" and "unpersuasive" under the Martindell standard. (Id. at 6). Judge Netbum concluded that "the Government must demonstrate not that this investigation is an extraordinary circumstance, but

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

uppression Motion Should Be Denied Maxwell seeks suppression of the evidence the Government obtained via a judicially authorized subpoena to under Martindell, the Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, the Due Process clause, and the Court's inherent authority. However, Maxwell's motion turns on erroneous fa

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N. Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initi

grand jury that had issued a alliena for the production of documents as parl'of an ongoing ation5). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

overnment's arguments for exceptional circumstances and compelling need as relying on "the general desire for secrecy" and "unpersuasive" under the Martindell standard. (Id. at 6). Judge Netburn concluded that "the Government must demonstrate not that this investigation is an extraordinary circumstance, bu

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

e, and the Court's inherent authority. However, Maxwell's motion turns on erroneous facts, runs afoul of controlling law, and should be denied. 1. Martindell Provides No Basis to Grant the Relief the Defendant Seeks Maxwell argues that the Government "circumvented" the Second Circuit's decision in Martin

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

Parties' reliance."). 79 EFTA00100046 cau PPIal (Id. washy a granrad issulaubeaurnalMI an In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martind ell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

her the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptionalcircumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification o fprotective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

otective order."); H.L. Hayden Co. of New York v. Siemens Med Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[W]e continue to adhere to our holding in Martindell [v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 294 (2d Cir. 1979)], that `this extraordinary writ [mandamus] would hardly be available ... wh

al by motion to quash or modify the subpoena ... or to seek permissive intervention in the private action.") (internal quotations omitted); but see Palmieri v. State of N Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (considering appeal where the New York State Attorney General, rather than the subject of the subpoena, w

er is "improvidently granted" where the presiding judge "reasonably should have recognized that [it] would facilitate or further criminal activity." Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865-66. But there is absolutely no evidence that the district court harbored any such realization; indeed, at the time Judge Sweet ent

rotective order"); H.L. Hayden Co. of New York v. Siemens Med Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[W]e continue to adhere to our holding in Martindell [v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 294 (2d Cir. 1979)), that 'this extraordinary writ [mandamus] would hardly be available . . .

l by motion to quash or modify the subpoena . .. or to seek permissive intervention in the private action.") (internal quotations omitted); but see Palmieri v. State of N. Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (considering appeal where the New York State Attorney General, rather than the subject of the s

(9th Cir. 2016) 4, 5, 11 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 2, 6 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm 'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) 2 Palmieri v. State of New York, 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985) 14 People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925 (Cob. 2009) 10 People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757 (Colo. 1999

. CONST. amend. IV passim U.S. CONST. amend. V passim iii EFTA00015306 --- PAGE BREAK --- Ghislaine Maxwell moves under the Fourth Amendment, Martindell v. Intl TeL & TeL Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), and the Fifth Amendment, to suppress all evidence the government obtained from a grand jury s

uit's II EFTA00015317 --- PAGE BREAK --- decision in Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. and violated Maxwell's rights. In Martindell, the government tried to obtain deposition transcripts of twelve individuals deposed in a private shareholders' derivative lawsuit. 594 F.2d at 292-