Epstein Secrets

27 passim United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1979) 30 United States v. French, 904 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2018) 47 United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2002) 36 United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980 (2d Cir. 1968) 29, 38 United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65(2d Cir. 1993)

Cir. 2002) 21 United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2015) 21 United States v. RMI Co., 599 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1979) 51 United States v. Sampson, 820 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D. Mass. 2011) United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) passim 53 United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273

well's challenge to the credibility of her accusers' memories or the expert testimony of Dr. Loftus.I2 Several decisions support this conclusion. In Sampson v. United States, for example, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to order a new penalty- phase hearing in a death penalty cas

ient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.'" Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 440 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987)). The defendant has otherwise failed to identify how she has been deprived of the right to a fair trial. A jur

ury is best equipped 119 EFTA00100086 to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287,307 (2d Cir. 2018).47 A narrow exception arises when language in a question is so "fundamentally ambiguous" that a Court can conclude,

14(a). "[I]n order to prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

cient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial!" Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 440 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987)). The defendant has otherwise failed to identify how she has been deprived of the right to a fair trial. A jur

ury is best equipped 119 EFTA00077751 to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).47 A narrow exception arises when language in a question is so "fundamentally ambiguous" that a Court can conclude

14(a). "[I]n order to prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

cient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial!" Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 440 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987)). The defendant has otherwise failed to identify how she has been deprived of the right to a fair trial. A jur

ury is best equipped 119 EFTA00039566 to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).47 A narrow exception arises when language in a question is so "fundamentally ambiguous" that a Court can conclude

14(a). "[I]n order to prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

cient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.' Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 440 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987)). The defendant has otherwise failed to identify how she has been deprived of the right to a fair trial. A jur

jury is best equipped to determine the meaning that a defendant 119 EFTA00095211 assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).48 An exception arises when language in a question is "fundamentally ambiguous," that is "when it is not a phrase

o prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, 139 EFTA00095231 "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

ient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial."' Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 440 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987)). The defendant has otherwise failed to identify how she has been deprived of the right to a fair trial. A jur

ury is best equipped 119 EFTA00103144 to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).47 A narrow exception arises when language in a question is so "fundamentally ambiguous" that a Court can conclude

14(a). "[I]n order to prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, "the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "

New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) 125 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) 151 Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1960) 164 Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) 158 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) 248 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) 225, 227

5, 6, 245 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 151 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 247, 249 United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183 (2d Cr. 2004) 208 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270 (2d Cr. 2018) 200, 201 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287 (2d Cir.

New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) 125 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) 151 Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1960) 164 Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) 158 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) 248 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) 225, 227

5, 6, 245 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 151 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 247, 249 United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004) 208 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2018) 200, 201 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287 (2d Cir

New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) 125 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) 151 Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1960) 164 Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) 158 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) 248 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) 225, 227

5, 6, 245 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 151 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 247, 249 United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004) 208 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2018) 200, 201 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287 (2d Cir

New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) 88 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) 104 Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1960) 112 Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) 108 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) 163 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) 150, 151

A00095086 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 104 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 163, 164 United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004) 140 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2018) 135, 136 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287 (2d Cir