Epstein Secrets

des strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly." United States States" Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, No. 11-85, S. Ct. 2011 WL 3055311 (Nov. 28, 2011) (quoting Mertens I. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 24

eding, and the right to 26 EFTA00205649 confer with the government's attorney, but is silent as to documents offered during the trial. See In re Slier, 571 F.3d at 609-10. Petitioners' belief that they are entitled to grand jury records also fails. The traditional rule of grand jury secrecy may be

estion that Congress intended, but simply forgot, to provide additional remedies beyond those already specified. Courts agree. See United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the CVRA's "carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme," provides "strong evidence that Co

8 F.3d 1308, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding "that the CVRA does not provide 'victims' with a right of access to the government's files"); cf. In re Slier, 571 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that "the CVRA does not provide an independent right to obtain PSRs"); Kenna v. United States, 453 F.3d

estion that Congress intended, but simply forgot, to provide additional remedies beyond those already specified. Courts agree. See United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the CVRA's "carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme," provides "strong evidence that Co

be heard at a proceeding, and the right to confer with the government's attorney, but is silent as to documents offered during the trial. See In re Slier, 571 F.3d at 609-10. Petitioners argument that they are entitled to grand jury records similarly fails. The traditional rule of grand jury secrecy