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ctrine prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . .'") (quoting Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the ripeness doctrine, a court must therefore

proceedings and the Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3771 (DE I, the "Petition"), through which Petitioners Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have advanced claims pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 This Court l

octrine prevents] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . .'") (quoting Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the ripeness doctrine, a court must therefore

proceedings and the Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3771 (DE I, the "Petition"), through which Petitioners Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have advanced claims pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' This Court la

doctrine prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements ....'") (quoting Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the ripeness doctrine, a court must therefore

proceedings and the Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3771 (DE I, the "Petition"), through which Petitioners Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have advanced claims pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' This Court la

doctrine prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . ...'") (quoting Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition.. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the ripeness doctrine, a court must therefore d

proceedings and the Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3771 (DE 1, the "Petition"), through which Petitioners Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have advanced claims pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' This Court la

doctrine prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements ....'") (quoting Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the ripeness doctrine, a court must therefore

proceedings and the Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3771 (DE I, the "Petition"), through which Petitioners Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have advanced claims pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' This Court la

doctrine prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements ....'") (quoting Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the ripeness doctrine, a court must therefore

proceedings and the Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3771 (DE I, the "Petition"), through which Petitioners Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have advanced claims pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' This Court la

ctrine prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . .'") (quoting Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the ripeness doctrine, a court must therefore

ther authorized or helped negotiate the resolution of the matter. See, e.g., United States' Second Supplemental Privilege Log filed as Dkt. 329-1 in Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 v. United States, No. 08-CV-80736 (S.D. Fla.) (the "CVRA litigation") (illustrating the number of prosecutors involved in the dec

ctrine prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . .'") (quoting Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the ripeness doctrine, a court must therefore

ther authorized or helped negotiate the resolution of the matter. See, e.g., United States' Second Supplemental Privilege Log filed as Dkt. 329-1 in Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 v. United States, No. 08-CV-80736 (S.D. Fla.) (the "CVRA litigation") (illustrating the number of prosecutors involved in the dec

FLSD Docket 07/05/2013 Page 2 of 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2, Petitioners, vs. UNITED STATES, Respondent. UNITED STATES' SEALED MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION The United Sta

ctrine prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . .'") (quoting Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the ripeness doctrine, a court must therefore