Epstein Secrets

narrowly tailored to achieve that aim."I3 12 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006). We observe that our holding in Lugosch relies on the general principle that parties may "be assumed to have supported their papers with admissible evidence and non-frivolous arguments."

" Id. at 122. Insofar as a district court has, through striking a filing, specifically found that assumption inapplicable, the categorical rule in Lugosch may not apply. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text, post. 13 Id. at 124. Examples of such countervailing values may include, depending on the c

compelled—because of a strong expectation of continued confidentiality. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2. While we appreciate the views expressed in Judge Pooler's separate opinion, the panel majority believes that the efforts invested by three former district judges in reviewing these materials adequately a

icated by disclosure of these materials. In the interests of judicial economy, any future appeal in this matter shall be referred to this panel. Pooler, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: I join the Court's opinion in every respect but one: the decision to unseal the summary judgment record oursel

—and the Court in its Order to Show Cause—rested heavily on Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). With respect, neither Lugosch nor any of the other 6 EFTA00791875 Case 18-2868, Document 141, 03/15/2019, 2519388, Page8 of 27 Second Circuit cases supports the position the

the parties. The Order to Show Cause rests on a number of premises that we respectfully submit are flawed. As the Court noted in the Order, under Lugosch a" strong presumption of access" attaches to documents submitted to a court for its consideration in a summary judgment motion. Doc.138 at 2. But a

at "materials" in the Order to Show Cause means all the summary judgment filings. However, in her partial dissent to the Order to Show Cause, Judge Pooler refers to "the materials attached to the motion for summary judgment." Id. (emphasis supplied). 19 EFTA00791888 Case 18-2868, Document 141, 03/1

g order is narrowly tailored to achieve that aim."13 " Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2016). 12 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006). We observe that our holding in Lugosch relies on the general principle that parties ma

ann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2016). 12 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006). We observe that our holding in Lugosch relies on the general principle that parties may "be assumed to have supported their papers with admissible evidence and non- frivolous arguments."

record as described further herein, and REMAND the cause to the District Court for particularized review of the remaining sealed materials. Judge Pooler concurs in this opinion except insofar as it orders the immediate unsealing of the summary judgment record without a remand. SANFORD L. BOHRER (Ch

e minimally redacted material was subject to a "strong presumption" of access under the First Amendment and the common law. Id. at 47 & n.12 (citing Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121-22). The deposition material at issue here, however, was not submitted to the district court in connection with summary judgment

d the case to the district court to conduct a particularized review of the remaining records to which the Herald sought access. Id at 53-54. Judge Pooler dissented in part. Id at 54. Although she agreed the district court erred, she would have had this Court unseal only the summary judgment order whi