Epstein Secrets

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) 172 United States v. Ramnath, 131 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1997) 300 United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015) 124 United States v. Reeves, et al., 16 Cr. 372 (VEC) 286 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953

cedure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), lijt has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

e used only where law enforcement "`exhibit[s] deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights."' United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Green, 981 F.3d

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) 172 United States v. Ramnath, 131 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1997) 300 United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015) 124 United States v. Reeves, et al., 16 Cr. 372 (VEC) 286 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953)

cedure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), li]t has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

e used only where law enforcement "`exhibit[s] deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights."' United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Green, 981 F.3d

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) 172 United States v. Ramnath, 131 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1997) 300 United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015) 124 United States v. Reeves, et al., 16 Cr. 372 (VEC) 286 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953)

cedure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), li]t has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

e used only where law enforcement "`exhibit[s] deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights."' United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Green, 981 F.3d

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) 116 United States v. Ramnath, 131 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1997) 208 United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015) 87 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953) 101 United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (200

edure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), '[i]t has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

e used only where law enforcement "`exhibit[s] deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights."' United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Green, 981 F.3d

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) 172 United States v. Ramnath, 131 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1997) 300 United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015) 124 United States v. Reeves, et al., 16 Cr. 372 (VEC) 286 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953

cedure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), li]t has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

e used only where law enforcement "`exhibit[s] deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights."' United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Green, 981 F.3d