Epstein Secrets

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

nzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 110 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953) 53 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) 181 Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) 147 Burgess v. United States, 552 U.S. 124 (2008) 51 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) 1

cedure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), lijt has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

Government could, on pain of criminal sanctions, compel an answer to its incriminating questions, a citizen is not at liberty to answer falsely."); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72, 90 (1969) (rejecting challenge to false statement prosecution; "[l]t cannot be thought that as a general principle of our law a ci

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

nzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 110 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953) 53 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) 181 Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) 147 Burgess v. United States, 552 U.S. 124 (2008) 51 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) 1

cedure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), li]t has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

Government could, on pain of criminal sanctions, compel an answer to its incriminating questions, a citizen is not at liberty to answer falsely."); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72, 90 (1969) (rejecting challenge to false statement prosecution; "[I]t cannot be thought that as a general principle of our law a ci

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

nzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 110 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953) 53 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) 181 Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) 147 Burgess v. United States, 552 U.S. 124 (2008) 51 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) 1

cedure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), li]t has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

Government could, on pain of criminal sanctions, compel an answer to its incriminating questions, a citizen is not at liberty to answer falsely."); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72, 90 (1969) (rejecting challenge to false statement prosecution; "[I]t cannot be thought that as a general principle of our law a ci

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

anzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 78 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953) 38 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) 121 Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) 101 Burgess v. United States, 552 U.S. 124 (2008) 37 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) 1

edure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), '[i]t has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

Government could, on pain of criminal sanctions, compel an answer to its incriminating questions, a citizen is not at liberty to answer falsely."); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72, 90 (1969) (rejecting challenge to false statement prosecution; "[I]t cannot be thought that as a general principle of our law a ci

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

nzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 110 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953) 53 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) 181 Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) 147 Burgess v. United States, 552 U.S. 124 (2008) 51 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) 1

cedure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), li]t has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

Government could, on pain of criminal sanctions, compel an answer to its incriminating questions, a citizen is not at liberty to answer falsely."); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72, 90 (1969) (rejecting challenge to false statement prosecution; "[I]t cannot be thought that as a general principle of our law a ci