Epstein Secrets

, the [attorney-client] privilege does not bar revelation of the original location or conduction of the evidence in question." Hunter at *3 (quoting Meredith at 54). While the investigator could not testify about the substance of any communications with the attorney, he had to tell the jury where the wall

n it over to the prosecution. Therefore, introduction of the evidence did not implicate the privilege. Hunter at *2 (citing Clutchette at 1472). In Meredith , a murder suspect informed his attorney that the murder victim's wallet was in the garbage can behind the suspect's house and the attorney sent a p

s that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which respondent now invites us to approve. We decline to do

, the [attorney-client] privilege does not bar revelation of the original location or conduction of the evidence in question." Hunter at *3 (quoting Meredith at 54). While the investigator could not testify about the substance of any communications with the attorney, he had to tell the jury where the wall

n it over to the prosecution. Therefore, introduction of the evidence did not implicate the privilege. Hunter at *2 (citing Clutchette at 1472). In Meredith , a murder suspect informed his attorney that the murder victim's wallet was in the garbage can behind the suspect's house and the attorney sent a p

rimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which respondent now invites us to approve. We decline to do

the [attorney- client] privilege does not bar revelation of the original location or conduction of the evidence in question." Hunter at *3 (quoting Meredith at 54). While the investigator could not testify about the substance of any communications with the attorney, he had to tell the jury where the wall

e defendant in Hunter, the defendant argued that the anomey-client privilege precluded admission of the receipts against him at trial. Similarly, in Meredith, the defense investigator found the murder victim's wallet based on information obtained from the defendant and turned it over to defendant's attorn

es that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which respondent now invites us to approve. We decline to do s