Epstein Secrets

17847, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2005) (Francis I) (staying federal civil action in favor of "a criminal case currently pending in state court in Bay County, Florida, arising from the same facts and involving the same parties as the Instant action," noting that "the language of 18 3 EFTA00221643 Case

18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mil

17847, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2005) (Francis I) (staying federal civil action in favor of "a criminal case currently pending in state court in Bay County, Florida, arising from the same facts and involving the same parties as the Instant action," noting that "the language of 18 3 EFTA00222644 Case

18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mi

17847, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2005) (Francis I) (staying federal civil action in favor of "a criminal case currently pending in state court in Bay County, Florida, arising from the same facts and involving the same parties as the Instant action," noting that "the language of 18 3 EFTA00222678 Case

18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mil

17847, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2005) (Francis I) (staying federal civil action in favor of "a criminal case currently pending in state court in Bay County, Florida, arising from the same facts and involving the same parties as the Instant action," noting that "the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) is cl

S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). The word "shall" means that the statute's command is mandatory and not subject to a Court's discretion. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory 'shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mi