Epstein Secrets

plain language of the statute, also adhered to the "well established priority of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings." Cf. United States v. Hanhardt, 156 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 (N.D. I11. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 50(a)). Conclusion Because this civil action arises from the same allegations

vis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion") (emphasis

plain language of the statute, also adhered to the "well established priority of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings." Cf. United States v. Hanhardt, 156 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 (N.D. III. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 50(a)). Conclusion Because this civil action arises from the same allegations

is, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion") (emphasis

plain language of the statute, also adhered to the "well established priority of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings." Cf. United States v. Hanhardt, 156 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 (N.D. I11. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 50(a)). Conclusion Because this civil action arises from the same allegations

vis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion") (emphasis