Epstein Secrets

plain language of the statute, also adhered to the "well established priority of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings." Cf. United States v. Hanhardt, 156 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 (N.D. I11. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 50(a)). Conclusion Because this civil action arises from the same allegations

18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mil

plain language of the statute, also adhered to the "well established priority of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings." Cf. United States v. Hanhardt, 156 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 (N.D. III. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 50(a)). Conclusion Because this civil action arises from the same allegations

18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mi

plain language of the statute, also adhered to the "well established priority of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings." Cf. United States v. Hanhardt, 156 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 (N.D. I11. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 50(a)). Conclusion Because this civil action arises from the same allegations

18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mil