Epstein Secrets

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

t's earlier cases [referring to Boyd ], have been discredited by later opinions." Andresen v. Maryland , 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976). In 1984, Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in United States v. Doe , 465 U.S. 605 (1984), just to make explicit what is implicit in the analysis of that opinion; t

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. I United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

rt's earlier cases [referring to Boyd ], have been discredited by later opinions." Andresen I Maryland , 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976). In 1984, Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in United States I Doe , 465 U.S. 605 (1984), just to make explicit what is implicit in the analysis of that opinion; th

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records ... in the hands of an attorney—or p

ourt's earlier cases [referring to Boyd], have been discredited by later opinions." Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976). In 1984, Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), just to make explicit what is implicit in the analysis of that opinion; th