Epstein Secrets

convict the witness of a crime or could aid in the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at trial. Id; Pillsbury Company v. Conboy, 495 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 608 (1983). The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the scope of the Fifth Amendment Privilege includes the ci

s a self-incriminating testimonial communication or "a compelled testimonial aspect." United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 120 S.Ct. 2037 (2000); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)• McCormick on Evidence, Title 6, Chap. 13. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, §138 (6th Ed.). See also

that the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and were authentic. United States v. Doe. 465 U.S., at 613, and n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1237; Fisher, 425 U.S., at 409-410, 96 S.Ct. 1569; id, at 428. 432, 96 S.Ct. 1569 (concurring opinions). See Braswell v. United States, 1487 U.S.,I at EFTA00221

convict the witness of a crime or could aid in the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at trial. Id; Pillsbury Company v. Conboy, 495 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 608 (1983). Certainly, if the USAO decides to prosecute EPSTEIN for an alleged violation of the NPA, it would undoubtedly

ubpoena (or production request) has a compelled testimonial aspect." United States v. Hubbell 530 U.S. 27, 36, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); McCormick on Evidence, Title 6, Chap. 13. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, §138 (61h Ed.). The priv

that the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and were authentic. United States v. Doe. 465 U.S., at 613. and n. 11. 104 S.Ct. 1237; Fisher. 425 U.S., at 409-410. 96 S.Ct. 1569; id. at 428. 432. 96 S.Ct. 1569 (concurring opinions). See Braswell v. United States. [487 U.S..1 at 104, 108 S

1321(2f M24 C.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. Page 12 the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at trial. Id; Pillsbury Company v. Conboy, 495 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 608 (1983). See also, Hubbell, supra, as to what is encompassed by the phrase "in any criminal case" contained in the Fifth

ubpoena (or production request) has a compelled testimonial aspect." United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000); see ado Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); McCormick on Evidence, Title 6, Chap. 13. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, §138 (6th Ed.). The priv

that the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and were authentic. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S., at 613, and n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1237. Fisher, 425 U.S., at 409-410. 96 S.Ct. 1569; id., at 428, 432, 96 S.Ct. 1569 10 EFTA00234830 causesabeftemenmisn R9seurniitilit51712 EngigMergrl-PPRP098

in venture. First ventur- er moved to dismiss or for summary judg- ment, and second venturer cross-moved for summary judgment. The District Court, Conboy, J., held that: (1) agreement under which first joint venturer agreed to return capital contribution to second joint venturer upon return of all i

case on December 17, 1997. Defendants' sole remaining defenses are that (1) 0FM orally consented to Epstein's proposed sublet of the premises to Fisher, and (2) 0FM did not properly terminate Epstein's lease be- Ron Soifer, and Carmen Tausik (collectively, the -Subtenants"). The Subtenants were add

dant Jeffrey E. Epstein in 1992. Epstein sublet the building to defendant Ivan S. Fish- er in 1996, purportedly without the Govern- ment's consent. Fisher, in turn, sublet a portion of the building to several subtenants. In 1996, the Government purported to ter- minate Epstein's lease and brought this

convict the witness of a crime or could aid in the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at trial. Id; Pillsbury Company v. Conboy, 495 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 608 (1983). Certainly, if the USAO decides to prosecute EPSTEIN for an alleged violation of the NPA, it would undoubtedly

ubpoena (or production request) has a compelled testimonial aspect." United States v. Hubbell 530 U.S. 27, 36, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); McCormick on Evidence, Title 6, Chap. 13. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, §138 (61h Ed.). The priv

that the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and were authentic. United States v. Doe. 465 U.S., at 613. and n. 11. 104 S.Ct. 1237; Fisher. 425 U.S., at 409-410. 96 S.Ct. 1569; id. at 428. 432. 96 S.Ct. 1569 (concurring opinions). See Braswell v. United States. [487 U.S..1 at 104, 108 S

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

eatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)). It does not prohibit the Government from usin

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

eatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)). It does not prohibit the Government from usin

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

eatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)). It does not prohibit the Government from usin

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

eatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)). It does not prohibit the Government from usin

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

eatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)). It does not prohibit the Government from usin