Epstein Secrets

, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) 254 In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. ("Enterprise", ), 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004) 36,43,44 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1991) 108, 113 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 199

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00077619 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government." Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of im

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) 254 In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. ("Enterprise", ), 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004) 36,43,44 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1991) 108, 113 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 199

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00039434 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government." Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of im

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) 166 In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. ("Enterprise"), 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004) 27, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1991) In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct 29, 1992, 28, 77, 33 81 1 F.3d 87 (2d

nited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 54 xii EFTA00095079 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 113, 114 United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 120, 121 United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 6, 18, 22 United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp

s the proper remedy.39 Indeed, none of the Second Circuit cases applying Martindell contemplate suppression as a remedy. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d at 1224 (remanding for findings "on whether the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the gover

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are am

entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government." Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of imm

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sanvari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame