Epstein Secrets

ction with prosecution by one sovereign do not carry over to prosecution by another sovereign. In Cobb , the Supreme Court clarified its holding in McNeil. Wisconsin , 501 U.S. 171 (1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutio

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factual

980); United States I Landof, , 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand flay Proceedings , 73 F.R.D. 647, 651 (M.D. Fl. 1977)). In Blackburn , the Middle District of Florida applied the act of production privilege under the premise that Boyd was still binding precedent. Even applying Boyd , the court found tha

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factual

80); United States v. Landof, , 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand flay Proceedings , 73 F.R.D. 647, 651 (M.D. Fl. 1977)). In Blackburn , the Middle District of Florida applied the act of production privilege under the premise that Boyd was still binding precedent. Even applying Boyd , the court found tha

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some -34- EFTA00179133 other courts: have read into McNeil's offense-specific definition an exception for crim

. 1980); United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 73 F.R.D. 647, 651 (M.D. Fl. 1977)). In Blackburn, the Middle District of Florida applied the act of production privilege under the premise that Boyd was still binding precedent. Even applying Boyd, the court found that