Epstein Secrets

ue," Esam el-Erian, one of the party's leaders, insisted to me. But that is exactly what the urban, secular moderates, who actually did spearhead the Tahrir revolt, fear. They are only now forming parties and trying to build networks that can reach the millions of traditional Egyptians living in the count

g underground and is now suddenly legal: the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. "Liberal people are feeling some concerns that they made the revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood can now take it. This is not true," Esam el-Erian, one of the party's leaders, insisted to me. But that is exactly what the urban, secular moderates,

s a very traditional society. In a country of 85 million, you have to wonder how much of it the Facebook kids, the secularists, and the liberals of Tahrir Square actually represented. The future of the 100-member constituent assembly charged with drafting the all-important constitution is now uncerta

to Kansas. Ankle 3. Foreign Policy Can the Brotherhood Win In Egypt Without Its No. 1 Star? Ashraf Khalil April 18, 2012 -- CAIRO — Last week, the Muslim Brotherhood's leading light, Khairat al-Shater, looked like a confident front-runner in Egypt's presidential race. On the night of April 12, more than 5,000 men

lar despot, uniformed or not? The events Friday were troubling. The Brotherhood has a hard time accepting dissent. Its avowed reason for occupying Tahrir — the acquittal last week of Mubarak-era officials accused of involvement in the deadly camel charge on protesters in the square last year — looked

olution, the Salafist Call entered the political fray and created the Nour Party, which quickly became the second largest party in parliament after the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party. The Salafist Call is the more influential sect within the Salafist current, and Alexandria is its bastion, but it also h

Mohamed Anis Salem 2 - 8 June 2011 -- Sooner or later, the question of reviewing Egypt's foreign policy was going to crop up. In the early days of Tahrir, observers noted that the uprising did not occupy itself with international affairs. When Israel voiced concerns about the future of its relations

her, these signals were received enthusiastically by Egypt's revolutionary youth, intellectuals, media and political movements (mostly, perhaps, by the Muslim Brothers) as a sign of a EFTA00584770 8 more independent foreign policy. But life is complicated. Arab League Secretary- General Amr Moussa was leaving h

ings. What does our reaction say about us?" They need to have that conversation. In Egypt, every day it becomes clearer that the Army has used the Tahrir uprising to get rid of its main long- term rival for succession — President Hosni Mubarak's more reform-minded son, Gamal. Now, having gotten rid o

is condemnation and boycott in the Arab League while arming and funding the opposition. Even more significantly, Qatar has been a major backer of the Muslim Brothers in their recent rise to power across the Arab region. This has caught the West by surprise, in particular the United States. Having spent the past

unity, and equal rights for all. For eighteen days last winter, that model for a new and democratic Egypt seemed plausible; it was being lived in Tahrir. Copts and Muslims, women and men, youth and the elderly, secular and religious protested and prayed together and shared tents and meals. The Copts

ng-term interests. Having operated in the Iranian strategic orbit in the past, Hamas might now wish to embrace its old identity as a branch of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas's decision, if real, will take time to implement. Since its founding in 1987, the organization's bread-and-butter stance has been armed res

Mohamed Anis Salem 2 - 8 June 2011 -- Sooner or later, the question of reviewing Egypt's foreign policy was going to crop up. In the early days of Tahrir, observers noted that the uprising did not occupy itself with international affairs. When Israel voiced concerns about the future of its relations

her, these signals were received enthusiastically by Egypt's revolutionary youth, intellectuals, media and political movements (mostly, perhaps, by the Muslim Brothers) as a sign of a EFTA_R 1_02029430 EFTA02689781 8 more independent foreign policy. But life is complicated. Arab League Secretary- General Amr M

Mohamed Anis Salem 2 - 8 June 2011 -- Sooner or later, the question of reviewing Egypt's foreign policy was going to crop up. In the early days of Tahrir, observers noted that the uprising did not occupy itself with international affairs. When Israel voiced concerns about the future of its relations

her, these signals were received enthusiastically by Egypt's revolutionary youth, intellectuals, media and political movements (mostly, perhaps, by the Muslim Brothers) as a sign of a EFTA_R1_02029496 EFTA02689824 8 more independent foreign policy. But life is complicated. Arab League Secretary- General Amr Mo

Mohamed Anis Salem 2 - 8 June 2011 -- Sooner or later, the question of reviewing Egypt's foreign policy was going to crop up. In the early days of Tahrir, observers noted that the uprising did not occupy itself with international affairs. When Israel voiced concerns about the future of its relations

her, these signals were received enthusiastically by Egypt's revolutionary youth, intellectuals, media and political movements (mostly, perhaps, by the Muslim Brothers) as a sign of a EFTA_R1_02030836 EFTA02690482 8 more independent foreign policy. But life is complicated. Arab League Secretary- General Amr Mo

b in the Ministry of Health. When she wrote a memoir about her time in jail, she began it using a prostitute's eyebrow pencil and toilet paper. In Tahrir she knew she belonged. Her American friend, Islamicist Bruce Lawrence, managed to reach her there by cell phone. "Bruce, Bruce," she exclaimed in d

s branding them as collaborators on the Palestinian street. Meanwhile, though better organized, Hamas briefly suggested it might take a leaf out of the Muslim Brotherhood's updated democracy playbook and not seek power even if it wins the 2012 election, content to be a parliamentary overseer. Most fundamentally, then,