Epstein Secrets

eling capabilities. Israeli jets would then have to circumvent Iranian air defenses and drop hundreds of precision-guided munitions on the hardened Natanz enrichment facility, the Fordow enrichment site deep in a mountain near Q(n, the Isfahan uranium-conversion facility, the heavy-water production pl

n plant and plutonium reactor under construction at Arak, and multiple centrifuge production facilities in and around populated areas of Tehran and Natanz. These same aircraft would not be able to reengage any missed targets — they would need to race back to defend Israel against retaliation by Iran a

he risks of a near-term Iraqi breakthrough were further undercut by the presence of French technicians at Osirak, as well as regular inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. As a result, any significant diversion of highly enriched uranium fuel or attempts to produce fissionable plutonium would probably have been detec

't building redundant enrichment facilities. There is a chance, of course, that EFTA00663304 Iran already has secret nuclear facilities (both the Natanz facility and the Fordo facility were carefully hidden from prying eyes for several years before they were discovered), so redundancy might be an in

ee that the Arak reactor is not functional. Fordow would be closed, and all Iranian nuclear EFTA00663298 activity would have to be carried out at Natanz. Last, the transformation to fuel rods would be done outside of Iran to ensure that the Iranians won't ever be able to use the enriched uranium for

ic number to prove that Iran has the presumptive right to enrich for nonmilitary purposes. It would also cap the amount of enriched material, which the International Atomic Energy Agency would oversee. To ensure this, Iran would have to re-sign and implement the additional protocol, which would enable the IAEA to carry out much more

h of 20 percent enriched uranium (the Fordow facility accounted for 9.5 pounds of this total). The Iranian regime had 8,800 centrifuges spinning at Natanz and 696 at Fordow. Once the Islamic Republic can produce 44 pounds of highly enriched uranium per month, which is not that far off given the EFTA0

riched uranium; (3) close the Fordow enrichment facility, which is buried under a mountain near the clerical city of Qom; (4) allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency immediate and unfettered access to any suspected nuclear site; and (5) permit the IAEA to install devices on centrifuges for monitoring uranium- en

f it) if a military inte=vention seems probable. In particular, a negotiated agreement where Iran i= required to suspend its enrichment activity in Natanz and Fordow might be.acceptable for the regime as long as the construction of the heavy water r=actor in Arak is allowed to continue. An agreement of

e the expected time frame between when the militarization pro=ess begins and when a nuclear bomb is produced, thereby reducing the time =vailable to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western interligence agencies to detect the militarization and for political decision m=kers to undertake actions to stop it. Iran can r

red concentration of U-235 is achieved. Finally, the UF6 is converted back to solid uranium. Iran's largest known enrichment facility, the infamous Natanz, was sabotaged for several years by Stuxnet, the most complex and technologically advanced computer virus ever designed. (Technically, Stuxnet is

by yet more talks to decide such trivialities as venue. These negotiations don't just gain time for a nuclear program about whose military intent the International Atomic Energy Agency is issuing alarming warnings. They make it extremely difficult for Israel to do anything about it (while it still can), lest Israel be universally