Epstein Secrets

military inte=vention seems probable. In particular, a negotiated agreement where Iran i= required to suspend its enrichment activity in Natanz and Fordow might be.acceptable for the regime as long as the construction of the heavy water r=actor in Arak is allowed to continue. An agreement of this kind

r would be quite large. If a military operation would leave the Arak =eactor intact and only focus on the three other critical facilities in Nat=nz, Fordow and Isfahan, Iran could use the reactor for producing material =or a nuclear bomb in the aftermath of the attack. In practice, this means =hat if a

e the expected time frame between when the militarization pro=ess begins and when a nuclear bomb is produced, thereby reducing the time =vailable to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western interligence agencies to detect the militarization and for political decision m=kers to undertake actions to stop it. Iran can r

would then have to circumvent Iranian air defenses and drop hundreds of precision-guided munitions on the hardened Natanz enrichment facility, the Fordow enrichment site deep in a mountain near Q(n, the Isfahan uranium-conversion facility, the heavy-water production plant and plutonium reactor under

he risks of a near-term Iraqi breakthrough were further undercut by the presence of French technicians at Osirak, as well as regular inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. As a result, any significant diversion of highly enriched uranium fuel or attempts to produce fissionable plutonium would probably have been detec

anium enrichment to 20 percent purity, which is near bomb-grade; (2) ship abroad the entire stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium; (3) close the Fordow enrichment facility, which is buried under a mountain near the clerical city of Qom; (4) allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agen

riched uranium; (3) close the Fordow enrichment facility, which is buried under a mountain near the clerical city of Qom; (4) allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency immediate and unfettered access to any suspected nuclear site; and (5) permit the IAEA to install devices on centrifuges for monitoring uranium- en

of an Iranian commitment to dismantle its nuclear program. Tehran would stop enrichment at all levels—even for nonmilitary purposes. It would close Fordow, its underground enrichment facility, and the Arak reactor, which is capable of producing plutonium for a bomb. Iran would also have to ship out it

ic number to prove that Iran has the presumptive right to enrich for nonmilitary purposes. It would also cap the amount of enriched material, which the International Atomic Energy Agency would oversee. To ensure this, Iran would have to re-sign and implement the additional protocol, which would enable the IAEA to carry out much more

tiated outcome is far more desirable, and then state that any acceptable negotiated deal must require immediate closing the underground facility at Fordow, freezing of all enrichment above five percent and exporting of all of Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched above that level, and imposing intrusiv

ress Israel's biggest concern and would surely interest U.S. officials. Mousavian also notes Iran's willingness to allow much wider inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into what are known as "possible military dimensions" of the Iranian nuclear program. This transparency proposal would allow the IAEA to mon