Epstein Secrets

would then have to circumvent Iranian air defenses and drop hundreds of precision-guided munitions on the hardened Natanz enrichment facility, the Fordow enrichment site deep in a mountain near Q(n, the Isfahan uranium-conversion facility, the heavy-water production plant and plutonium reactor under

eling capabilities. Israeli jets would then have to circumvent Iranian air defenses and drop hundreds of precision-guided munitions on the hardened Natanz enrichment facility, the Fordow enrichment site deep in a mountain near Q(n, the Isfahan uranium-conversion facility, the heavy-water production pl

n plant and plutonium reactor under construction at Arak, and multiple centrifuge production facilities in and around populated areas of Tehran and Natanz. These same aircraft would not be able to reengage any missed targets — they would need to race back to defend Israel against retaliation by Iran a

military inte=vention seems probable. In particular, a negotiated agreement where Iran i= required to suspend its enrichment activity in Natanz and Fordow might be.acceptable for the regime as long as the construction of the heavy water r=actor in Arak is allowed to continue. An agreement of this kind

r would be quite large. If a military operation would leave the Arak =eactor intact and only focus on the three other critical facilities in Nat=nz, Fordow and Isfahan, Iran could use the reactor for producing material =or a nuclear bomb in the aftermath of the attack. In practice, this means =hat if a

f it) if a military inte=vention seems probable. In particular, a negotiated agreement where Iran i= required to suspend its enrichment activity in Natanz and Fordow might be.acceptable for the regime as long as the construction of the heavy water r=actor in Arak is allowed to continue. An agreement of

of an Iranian commitment to dismantle its nuclear program. Tehran would stop enrichment at all levels—even for nonmilitary purposes. It would close Fordow, its underground enrichment facility, and the Arak reactor, which is capable of producing plutonium for a bomb. Iran would also have to ship out it

't building redundant enrichment facilities. There is a chance, of course, that EFTA00663304 Iran already has secret nuclear facilities (both the Natanz facility and the Fordo facility were carefully hidden from prying eyes for several years before they were discovered), so redundancy might be an in

ee that the Arak reactor is not functional. Fordow would be closed, and all Iranian nuclear EFTA00663298 activity would have to be carried out at Natanz. Last, the transformation to fuel rods would be done outside of Iran to ensure that the Iranians won't ever be able to use the enriched uranium for

, which consists of many facilities, widely dispersed and well protected. The most critical one, nestled deep underground within a mountain, is the Fordow site, and its -three thousand-plus centrifuges have enabled Iran to spin out enriched uranium from uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) to a level of 19.

o build a nuclear weapon: i) the Esfahan uranium conversion plant, where yellow cake is turned into uranium oxide and uranium hexafluoride; ii) the Natanz centrifuge complex; iii) the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, which, though yet to be fueled, offers a plutonium pathway to nuclear arms; iv) the

anium enrichment to 20 percent purity, which is near bomb-grade; (2) ship abroad the entire stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium; (3) close the Fordow enrichment facility, which is buried under a mountain near the clerical city of Qom; (4) allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agen

h of 20 percent enriched uranium (the Fordow facility accounted for 9.5 pounds of this total). The Iranian regime had 8,800 centrifuges spinning at Natanz and 696 at Fordow. Once the Islamic Republic can produce 44 pounds of highly enriched uranium per month, which is not that far off given the EFTA0

senior U.S. official who is an expert on Iran. The official said some Pentagon war planners believe conventional bombs won't be effective against Fordow and that a tactical nuclear weapon may be the only military option if the goal is to destroy the facility. "Once things go into the mountain, then

something that takes the mountain off," the official said. The official said the MOP may be more effective against Iran's main enrichment plant at Natanz but added: "But even that is guesswork." The Pentagon notified Congress in mid-January that it wants to divert around $82 million to refine the MOP

are various ways of making sure that this reactor will remain exclusively peaceful." Asked about a U.S. demand to close the enrichment facility at Fordow, built into a mountainside, Zarif said: "If you sit in Iran, and you see people having concerns about Fordow, the only conclusion you can draw is t

International Atomic Energy Agency]. Daily! So we cannot do anything in Fordow. The only difference that Fordow has from the enrichment facility at Natanz is that Fordow cannot be hit. So if you insist that I should dismantle Fordow, or do something with Fordow, that means that somebody has an intenti

would then have to circumvent Iranian air defenses and drop hundreds of precision-guided munitions on the hardened Natanz enrichment facility, the Fordow enrichment site deep in a mountain near Qom, the Isfahan uranium- conversion facility, the heavy-water production plant and plutonium reactor under

ling capabilities. Israeli jets would then have to circumvent Iranian air defenses and drop hundreds of precision-guided munitions on the hardened Natanz enrichment facility, the Fordow enrichment site deep in a mountain near Qom, the Isfahan uranium- conversion facility, the heavy-water production pl

weapons-grade material -- transfer its existing stock of such fuel to a third country, and shut down one of its two enrichment facilities, known as Fordow. In exchange, the parties will help Iran produce such fuel for medical purposes, which the regime claims is its actual goal. Iran has refused, sayi

2 kilos of uranium enriched to 20%, which is close to bomb- grade. Last month, Iran declared that it would install 3,000 advanced centrifuges at its Natanz facility, which can enrich uranium at two to three times its current rate. As for the sanctions, they may hurt ordinary Iranians but this regime is

232 kilos of uranium enriched to 20%, which is close to bomb-grade. Last month, Iran declared that it would install 3,000 advanced centrifuges at its Natanz facility, which can enrich uranium at two to three times its current rate. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027103 --- PAGE BREAK --- As for the sanctions, they ma

o weapons-grade material -- transfer its existing stock of such fuel to a third country, and shut down one of its two enrichment facilities, known as Fordow. In exchange, the parties will help Iran produce such fuel for medical purposes, which the regime claims is its actual goal. Iran has refused, saying