Epstein Secrets

gime—a vital interest to the Tehran regime, as noted. Suleimani also appears to run the "Iraq" account for Tehran, coordinating with Prime Minister Maliki in support of extralegal killings of defenseless Iranian dissidents inside Iraq by a special unit of Iraqi forces attached to the Prime Minister's

nd strategic purpose. Some observers—press photographers, at the very least—were disappointed when President Obama's opportunity to greet President Rouhani personally at the UN in September did not materialize. Mr. Obama's telephone call to Mr. Rouhani as the latter headed for the airport to return to

and Sunni Arab oppositionists collectively won around 160 seats -- just shy of the 165 required to ratify a prime minister -- opponents of a third Maliki term would have to set aside their differences and demonstrate near-perfect cohesion to unseat him. Maliki is therefore the front runner for now, t

is a fundamental issue of autarky, of folks in the Revolutionary Guard who make money from a closed economy and will use any opportunity to trash Rouhani and Zarif. This is similar to the situation here in the United States, where there are people who fundamentally want regime change in Iran and do n

ld h=ve tried harder to extend the American presence. Moreover, they said=the president has not done enough to pressure Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al=Maliki to reconcile with the Sunni minority, and they said Mr. Obama's f=ilure to do more to help moderate rebels in next-door Syria has emboldened more r

ties and should not be allowe= to ruin the real prospect of the historic deal before us. 12 EFTA_R1_02111350 EFTA02708703 When current Presid=nt Hassan Rouhani and I were leading the Iranian nuclear negotiating team =lmost 10 years ago, just before the election of former president Mahmoud A=madinejad, I pre