Epstein Secrets

arily requir[es]" that conduct. Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 785 (2020) (internal quotations omitted). Those cases date back at least to Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which construed the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act's extension of statutes of limitations for "any of

ails" or "elements of the offense" approach is particularly appropriate for three additional reasons here. First, like the Wartime Suspension Act in Bridges, § 3283 creates an "exception" to the general five-year limitations period of § 3282, and such exceptions should be "narrowly construed." Bridges,

legislative history at issue did not clearly evidence Congress' intent regarding retroactivity. Id. That is not the case here. As Judge Katzman of the Second Circuit has recognized, unambiguous legislative history should not be disregarded: When courts construe statutes in ways that respect what legislators cons

the Sexual or Physical Abuse or Kidnapping of a Child 14 CONCLUSION 16 EFTA00028904 --- PAGE BREAK --- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953) 11, 13, 14 Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) 14 Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 1

uit's acknowledgment that the retroactivity of the 2003 Amendment must be analyzed under Landgraf. Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48, 54-58 (2d Cir. 2017). 3 No Landgraf analysis was performed, nor was Congress' rejection of the retroactivity provision discussed, in United States v. Brown, 800 F

x, 527 U.S. 343, 355-57 (1999) (examining "structure and legislative history" as part of first Landgraf step). And as the government acknowledges, "the Second Circuit has considered both the text of the statute and the legislative history" at the first Landgraf step. Opp. 28 (citing In re Enterprise Mortgage Acce

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00020269 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00022099 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00029548 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 208 Filed 04/16