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the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str
efendant would automatically rebut the presumption applicable to crimes such as sex trafficking. That is manifestly incorrect. See United States v. Artis, 607 F. App'x 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that a defendant's lack of criminal record was "not so compelling as to defeat the presumption or to ma
the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str
efendant would automatically rebut the presumption applicable to crimes such as sex trafficking. That is manifestly incorrect. See United States v. Artis, 607 F. App'x 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that a defendant's lack of criminal record was "not so compelling as to defeat the presumption or to ma
the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str
efendant would automatically rebut the presumption applicable to crimes such as sex trafficking. That is manifestly incorrect. See United States v. Artis, 607 F. App'x 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that a defendant's lack of criminal record was "not so compelling as to defeat the presumption or to ma
the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str
efendant would automatically rebut the presumption applicable to crimes such as sex trafficking. That is manifestly incorrect. See United States v. Artis, 607 F. App'x 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that a defendant's lack of criminal record was "not so compelling as to defeat the presumption or to ma
the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str
efendant would automatically rebut the presumption applicable to crimes such as sex trafficking. That is manifestly incorrect. See United States v. Artis, 607 F. App'x 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that a defendant's lack of criminal record was "not so compelling as to defeat the presumption or to ma
the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str
efendant would automatically rebut the presumption applicable to crimes such as sex trafficking. That is manifestly incorrect. See United States v. Artis, 607 F. App'x 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that a defendant's lack of criminal record was "not so compelling as to defeat the presumption or to ma
the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str
efendant would automatically rebut the presumption applicable to crimes such as sex trafficking. That is manifestly incorrect. See United States v. Artis, 607 F. App'x 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that a defendant's lack of criminal record was "not so compelling as to defeat the presumption or to ma
the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str
efendant would automatically rebut the presumption applicable to crimes such as sex trafficking. That is manifestly incorrect. See United States v. Artis, 607 F. App'x 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that a defendant's lack of criminal record was "not so compelling as to defeat the presumption or to ma
the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str
efendant would automatically rebut the presumption applicable to crimes such as sex trafficking. That is manifestly incorrect. See United States v. Artis, 607 F. App'x 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that a defendant's lack of criminal record was "not so compelling as to defeat the presumption or to ma
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