Epstein Secrets

s to be Lebanon's reluctance to annoy Turkey, which believes it has a crucial interest in the island's decisions. This belief dates from 1974, when Ankara ordered the invasion of Cyprus in order to protect the Turkish- speaking minority. Several thousand Turkish soldiers still occupy positions in the

hmadinejad's insubordination; privately, however, he unleashed jackals that had long been salivating for the president's comeuppance. The powerful Revolutionary Guards — who helped engineer Ahmadinejad's contested 2009 reelection — swiftly declared their devotion to Khamenei, and several of the president's adviser

e world that it could think and act for itself when it comes to foreign policy, that the Cold War was over and that Washington could no longer take Ankara for granted. And yet this move did not mean, as some critics immediately EFTA_R1_00228270 EFTA01841734 claimed, a turn toward Islam and away fro

s influence throughout the region. Neither Iran nor Hezbollah in Lebanon would welcome those developments. Already there are reports that Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah fighters have supported the pro-Assad forces, and both would have strong incentives to back an Alawite insurgency against a Sunni-dom

e Mavi Marmara raid in which Israeli commandos killed eight Turks and one Turkish-American in May 2010, the events have not exactly taken the route Ankara wished them to take. A well-deserved apology for the Israeli fiasco and the unnecessary loss of life has never arrived. Nor has compensation for th

sewhere. That would require a degree of organization and infrastructure. Iran already has the means and EFTA00686842 capability to do this, using Revolutionary Guards from the Quds Force or Hezbollah, its Lebanese terrorist surrogates. Al-Qaeda, which has established a front inside Syria, has expressed an interes