Epstein Secrets

, or coercing a person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). In United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution. The N

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

, or coercing a person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). In United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution. The N

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

g, or coercing a person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). In United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution. The N

her sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are int

, or coercing a person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). In United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution. The N

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

, or coercing a person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). In United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution. The N

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

, or coercing a person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). In United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution. The N

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in