Epstein Secrets

herena before giving up. I also learned from a Russian researcher that Kucherena had not given a single interview since his television interview with Sophie Shevardnadze on September 23, 2013. And no Russian journalist, or ary Moscow-based foreign journalist, had ever obtained an interview with Snowden. At this point,

be used to motivate someone to “act alone” in gathering espionage material. I next turned to an even more important KGB coup with Cher- kashin: the Robert Hanssen case. From the KGB’s perspective, Hans- sen was an extraordinary espionage source. He was a walk-in who @ never entered the Soviet embassy or met wi

: Glenn Greenwald, “Email Exchange Between Edward Snowden and Former GOP Senator Gordon Humphrey,” Guardian, July 16, 2013. 171 An answer soon came: Sophie Shevardnadze, “’Snowden Believes He Did Everything Right’: Lawyer Anatoly Kucherena,” SophieCo, RT television, Sept. 23, 2013, //www.rt.com/shows/sophieco/snowden

are sent over the Internet. He told Greenwald, for example, that encryption was “critically necessary” for anyone to evade NSA surveillance. Just as Robert Hanssen had deliberately compromised the NSA’s interception of Soviet communications in Washington, D.C., in the 1990s, Snowden deliberately compromised the

om his Moscow lawyer, Anatoly Kucherena. On September 23, 2013, Kucherena had an extensive interviewed on the state owned RT channel. The interviewer Sophie Shevardnadze, who had a show on RT Television, called “Sophie & Co,” was well-admired journalist in her own right. She is also the grand-daughter of Edward Shevar

ly mean such a mole does not exist. Historically, we have many notable cases in which Russian moles eluded intensive investigations for many decades. Robert Hanssen served as a KGB penetration in the FBI for over 20 years without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames, acted as a KGB mole in the CIA for more than

ng up. I also learned from a Russian researcher that Kucherena had not given a single interview to any journalist since his television interview with Sophie Shevardnadze on September 23, 2013. And no Russian journalist, or any Moscow-based foreign journalist, had ever obtained an interview with Snowden. At this point,

on the NSA payroll in May 2013. If he intended to damage the NSA’s ability to monitor unsuspecting individuals abroad, he clearly succeeded. Just as Robert Hanssen had compromised the NSA’s interception of communication at the Soviet Embassy in the 1990s, Snowden compromised the NSA’s interception of Jihadist ta