Epstein Secrets

eper program through Poteyev soon after it began. The issue was how to exploit this knowledge. When I was writing my book on international deception, Angleton had pointed out to me that “the business of intelligence services is understanding precisely the relationship of their opposition to them.” His view,

final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence coup, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept the Russian or Chinese intelligence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self-described “single point of failure,”

s of undelivered NSA documents found in his home, the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was murdered the KGB, in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death, to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.) The Rus

mestic Surveillance Under Obama.” Along with it was the FISA warrant to Verizon. The PRISM story broke hours later in the Washington Post. Written by Gellman and Poitras, it claimed that the NSA and FBI were tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S, Internet companies which were knowin

e name and provided his credit card, but he was he in contact with three high-profile journalists, two well-known hacktavists and, as he suggested to Gellman, a foreign diplomatic mission. Even if Snowden had failed to persuade the Washington Post to publish a coded identifier, the mission’s interest would

e entirely hidden, is kept veiled, as far as is possible, to increase the value of the coup. “The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli- gence service

“The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli- gence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self- described “single point of failur

of undelivered NSA documents found in his home, @ the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was mur- dered by the KGB in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death, to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.) The

ts that could undo the NSA’s intelligence gathering as “the single point of failure.” While still shielding his own identity in May 2013, he wrote to Gellman that U.S. intelligence “will most certainly kill you if they think you are the single point of failure that could stop this disclosure and make them

94), xxii. @ 186 The CIA learned of this: Former NSA official who requested anonymity, inter- view with author. 187 “the business of intelligence”: Angleton, interview with author. 187 preparing these “Americans”: FBI, “Operation Ghost Stories: Inside the Rus- sian Spy Case,” Oct. 31, 2011, https://www.f

tates v. Har- old J. Nicholson,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm /ciaspy/affidavt.htm. 223 When it comes to recruiting moles: Angleton, interviews with author. 224 well experienced with false flags: Epstein, Deception, 22-28. 224 the “Trust” deception: Ibid. Also, Raymond Rocca (th

”: Shils, Torment of Secrecy. 47 “|The elites] know everything”: Roy, “Edward Snowden Meets Arundhati Roy and John Cusack.” 47 “What do you think”: Gellman, “Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA Rev- elations, Says His Mission’s Accomplished.” 48 violate U.S. espionage laws: Michael Hayden, interview wit

to life imprisonment. Looking at his watch, Cherkashin politely excused himself, saying he had work to do. On parting, I signed a copy of my book on Angleton for him and thanked him for his insights. Through the eyes of the KGB, a penetration of American intelligence was clearly opportunistic. If these pr

Spy Case.” October 31,2011, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/201 1/october/russian_103111/russian_10311 1 > Author's interview with James Jesus “Angleton had pointed out...’ Angleton. “The situation suddenly changed...”-- Bill Gertz, “Counterspies hunt Russian mole inside National Security Agency,” Wa

ed rendezvous with a journalist. As previously mentioned, when he left Hong Kong not a single journalist had agreed to meet him in Hong Kong. Indeed, Gellman considered Hong Kong, as he put it, “in the jurisdiction of a country that’s unfriendly to the United States,” and notified Snowden that he would not

970s for my book on deception that intelligence services play by a different set of rules than historians when it comes to their espionage successes. Angleton, a famously baroque thinker himself, impressed on me the complexity of espionage. He said “It’s not enough just to steal a secret. It must be done in

s for his journalistic event. He was also apparently in contact with at least one foreign mission during this period, according to what he written to Gellman on May 25". In that email concerning when and how his story was to be published by the Washington Post, Snowden even asked Gellman to include in it s