Epstein Secrets

War. But the Snowden breach exposing military sources was an order of magnitude greater than any past breach. The CIA’s assessment was no less grim. Morell, the deputy director of the CIA in 2013, wrote that Snowden’s action went beyond taking the handful of documents, such as the FISA order, “that addre

A briefer that it was urgent for the CIA to be brought in on the case. After all, the CIA had employed Snowden only four years earlier. Specifically, Morell said, the CIA needed to find out three things: Had CIA docu- ments been part of Snowden’s haul? How long had Snowden been stealing documents? Had Sno

are deemed “dan- gles,” or agents dispatched by the KGB to test and confuse the CIA. @ Others are rejected as political liabilities, as happened to Wang Lijun, @ a well-connected police chief in China. In February 2012, Wang walked into the U.S. consulate in Chengdu asking for asylum. The State Department d

ay of the 9/11 attack, “Terrorist organizations around the world were already start- ing to modify their actions in light of what Snowden disclosed,” Morell wrote in 2015. “Within weeks of the [Snowden] leaks, com- @ munications sources dried up, tactics were changed.” Even more @ disturbing, suspects on

w with author. 134 The NSA had also notified: Former NSA executive who requested anonymity, interview with author. 136 NSA did not immediately share: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 283-88. 136 briefed by the NSA: See “Unclassified Declaration of David G. Leatherwood,” US. District Court for the District o

“NSA Inspector General Speaks on Snowden for First Time,” Shadow Proof, Feb. 25, 2014. 157 KGB major Anatoliy Golitsyn: Bagley, Spy Wars, 6-11. 158 Wang Lijun: Steven Lee Myers and Mark Landler, “Frenzied Hours for U.S. on Fate of a China Insider,” New York Times, April 17, 2012. 159 “I think Snowden is”:

lations.” (He was correct that Snowden had stolen a larger number of CIA documents that he had not turned over to journalists, as CIA deputy director Morell confirmed.) Whatever this material might reveal, the FSB was presumably aware of its existence. After all, Kucherena was on the FSB’s public oversig

agents dispatched by the KGB to test and HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020278 (27 confuse the CIA. Others are rejected as political liabilities, as happened to Wang Lijun, a well- connected police chief in China. In February 2012, Wang, walked into at the US consulate in Chengdu asking from asylum. The State Department

s around the world were already starting to modify their actions in light of what Snowden disclosed. Communication sources dried up.” What heightened Morell’s concern about this loss of intelligence sources was the discovery a 26-page document on an ISIS computer in Syria indicating that the terrorist gro

H. Bagley, Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games, (Yale University Press, New Haven) 2008, pp. 6-11 See Also, Anatoli Golitsyn in Appendix A “Wang Lijun, a well-connected...”-- Steven Lee Myers and Mark Landler, “Frenzied Hours for U.S. on Fate of a China Insider,” /New York Times, April 17, 2012 “Wi