Epstein Secrets

ity, wrote that Snowden’s action went beyond taking the handful of documents, such as the FISA order, “that addressed the privacy issue.” Instead, as Morell put it, “he backed up a virtual tractor trailer and emptied a warehouse full of documents—the vast majority of which he could not possibly have read

of which he would likely understand—T[and] and he delivered the documents to a variety of news organizations and God knows who else.” _—_As a result, Morell concluded “Snowden’s disclosures will go down in history as the greatest compromise of classified information ever.” General Keith Alexander, the he

Intelligence Committee on March 12, 2013. Senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) of the Committee asked the spy master if the NSA collected data on Americans. Clapper answered that the NSA did not knowingly “collect any type of data” on millions of Americans. Clapper’s answer was clearly untrue. However, it did not

ier that the NSA did not collect phone data in America. This warrant would allow the Guardian, in the best tradition of “Gotcha” journalism, to catch Clapper in an apparent lie. Continuing his string-pulling, he instructed Poitras not to show the FISA warrant to Greenwald until they were safely aboard the

War. But the Snowden breach exposing military sources was an order of magnitude greater than any past breach. The CIA’s assessment was no less grim. Morell, the deputy director of the CIA in 2013, wrote that Snowden’s action went beyond taking the handful of documents, such as the FISA order, “that addre

A briefer that it was urgent for the CIA to be brought in on the case. After all, the CIA had employed Snowden only four years earlier. Specifically, Morell said, the CIA needed to find out three things: Had CIA docu- ments been part of Snowden’s haul? How long had Snowden been stealing documents? Had Sno

Snowden supporters, described the NSA activities exposed by Snowden as part of a vast criminal conspiracy involv- ing, among others, President Obama, James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, and both Democratic and Republican members of the congressional oversight committees. It further derided any

VERSIGHT_019617 130 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS per answered that the NSA did not knowingly “collect any type of data” on millions of Americans. Clapper’s answer was clearly untrue, but it did not mislead Senator Wyden or any other members of the Senate Intelligence Committee; Clapper had truthfully t

ay of the 9/11 attack, “Terrorist organizations around the world were already start- ing to modify their actions in light of what Snowden disclosed,” Morell wrote in 2015. “Within weeks of the [Snowden] leaks, com- @ munications sources dried up, tactics were changed.” Even more @ disturbing, suspects on

w with author. 134 The NSA had also notified: Former NSA executive who requested anonymity, interview with author. 136 NSA did not immediately share: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 283-88. 136 briefed by the NSA: See “Unclassified Declaration of David G. Leatherwood,” US. District Court for the District o

vey Oswald (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 64-104. 129 Clapper answered that: The transcript was published by The Washington Post, Jan. 29, 2014. For Clapper’s earlier closed-door testimony, see Steven Aftergood, “The Clapper ‘Lie’ and the Senate Intelligence Committee,” FAS, Jan. 6, 2014. 130 On his appl

vernment, and defected to Russia. See Edward Jay Epstein, Legend: The Secret World of Lee Har- vey Oswald (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 64-104. 129 Clapper answered that: The transcript was published by The Washington Post, Jan. 29, 2014. For Clapper’s earlier closed-door testimony, see Steven Aftergood,

e also continued to invite activists to his CryptoParties, and he openly advertised them on the Internet until 2013. The CIA’s former deputy director Morell, who reviewed the security situation at the NSA in 2014 as a mem- ber of President Obama’s NSA Review Committee, found that the NSA in the post-Cold

ing records for ninety days to the NSA. It was as close to a smoking gun as anything he had copied at the NSA. It would also get atten- tion because James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, had stated before Congress just two months earlier that the NSA did not collect phone data in America. This w

ier that the NSA did not collect phone data in America. This warrant would allow The Guard- ian, in the best tradition of gotcha journalism, to catch Clapper in an apparent lie. Continuing his string pulling, Snowden instructed Poitras not to show the FISA warrant to Greenwald until they were safely aboar

lations.” (He was correct that Snowden had stolen a larger number of CIA documents that he had not turned over to journalists, as CIA deputy director Morell confirmed.) Whatever this material might reveal, the FSB was presumably aware of its existence. After all, Kucherena was on the FSB’s public oversig

NSA “There are many things we do in intelligence that, if revealed, would have the potential for all kinds of blowback,” -- National Intelligence” — James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence In the Game of Nations, which is played at a level that often is not visible to public scrutiny, the great prize

s around the world were already starting to modify their actions in light of what Snowden disclosed. Communication sources dried up.” What heightened Morell’s concern about this loss of intelligence sources was the discovery a 26-page document on an ISIS computer in Syria indicating that the terrorist gro

that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies” in the fifth volume of his autobiography Closing the Ring, (Houghton Mifflin, 1951) 36. “Clapper answered that the NSA...”—the transcript was published by the Washington Post, January 29, 2014. For Clapper’s earlier closed door testimony, see Ste