Epstein Secrets

. Unlike the telephone program that Snowden revealed, the PRISM program produced actionable intelligence until the time when Snowden blew it. General Hayden, who was NSA director during the three years following the 9/11 attack, wrote that these surveil- lance powers, among other things, “uncovered illici

“NSA Inspector General Speaks on Snowden for First Time,” Shadow Proof, Feb. 25, 2014. 157 KGB major Anatoliy Golitsyn: Bagley, Spy Wars, 6-11. 158 Wang Lijun: Steven Lee Myers and Mark Landler, “Frenzied Hours for U.S. on Fate of a China Insider,” New York Times, April 17, 2012. 159 “I think Snowden is”:

and they are very grateful” American intelligence officers knowledgeable about the operations of the FSB, agreed with Kalugin’s assessment. General Hayden, for example, who served both as director of the NSA, CIA, and Air Force counterintelligence, told me in an interview that he saw no other possibilit

agents dispatched by the KGB to test and HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020278 (27 confuse the CIA. Others are rejected as political liabilities, as happened to Wang Lijun, a well- connected police chief in China. In February 2012, Wang, walked into at the US consulate in Chengdu asking from asylum. The State Department

RSIGHT_020405 254 10. CHAPTER FIFTEEN Did Snowden Act Alone? > “Totality of Snowden’s Actions,”— Author’s interview with Michael Hayden. Also, “Hayden interview,” Meet The Press, NBC, December 15, 2013 “Maclean stole immensely valuable. ..”—See Appendix A, Donald Maclean “Whistle blower Bradley Bi

H. Bagley, Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games, (Yale University Press, New Haven) 2008, pp. 6-11 See Also, Anatoli Golitsyn in Appendix A “Wang Lijun, a well-connected...”-- Steven Lee Myers and Mark Landler, “Frenzied Hours for U.S. on Fate of a China Insider,” /New York Times, April 17, 2012 “Wi