Epstein Secrets

arfare, conventional defensive rules do not apply. “There are no rivers or hills up here. It’s all flat. All advantage goes to the attacker,” General Hayden said in an inter- view in 2015 with the publisher of The Wall Street Journal. His point was that because there are no defensive positions, the United

arrant to investigate U.S. citi- @ zens who use Tor. The NSA is hardly immune from an attack on its own computers. As the former CIA deputy director Morell wrote in his 2015 book, The Great War of Our Time, many financial institutions have “better cyber security than the NSA.” The Internet certainly help

her actors. “For our enemies, having it [the black budget] is like having the playbook of the opposing NFL team,” said the former CIA deputy director Morell in 2015. “I guarantee you that the SVR, the Russian foreign intelligence service, would have paid millions of dollars for such a document.” If unlike

. Unlike the telephone program that Snowden revealed, the PRISM program produced actionable intelligence until the time when Snowden blew it. General Hayden, who was NSA director during the three years following the 9/11 attack, wrote that these surveil- lance powers, among other things, “uncovered illici

ay of the 9/11 attack, “Terrorist organizations around the world were already start- ing to modify their actions in light of what Snowden disclosed,” Morell wrote in 2015. “Within weeks of the [Snowden] leaks, com- @ munications sources dried up, tactics were changed.” Even more @ disturbing, suspects on

w with author. 134 The NSA had also notified: Former NSA executive who requested anonymity, interview with author. 136 NSA did not immediately share: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 283-88. 136 briefed by the NSA: See “Unclassified Declaration of David G. Leatherwood,” US. District Court for the District o

e-piping.” One result was that the NSANet, which Snowden had access to at Dell in 2012, became a shared network. It had common access points. General Hayden described them to me as the equivalent of “reading rooms” in a library. They served as a means for NSA workers to exchange ideas about the problems t

ity, wrote that Snowden’s action went beyond taking the handful of documents, such as the FISA order, “that addressed the privacy issue.” Instead, as Morell put it, “he backed up a virtual tractor trailer and emptied a warehouse full of documents—the vast majority of which he could not possibly have read

of which he would likely understand—T[and] and he delivered the documents to a variety of news organizations and God knows who else.” _—_As a result, Morell concluded “Snowden’s disclosures will go down in history as the greatest compromise of classified information ever.” General Keith Alexander, the he

and they are very grateful” American intelligence officers knowledgeable about the operations of the FSB, agreed with Kalugin’s assessment. General Hayden, for example, who served both as director of the NSA, CIA, and Air Force counterintelligence, told me in an interview that he saw no other possibilit

lations.” (He was correct that Snowden had stolen a larger number of CIA documents that he had not turned over to journalists, as CIA deputy director Morell confirmed.) Whatever this material might reveal, the FSB was presumably aware of its existence. After all, Kucherena was on the FSB’s public oversig

RSIGHT_020405 254 10. CHAPTER FIFTEEN Did Snowden Act Alone? > “Totality of Snowden’s Actions,”— Author’s interview with Michael Hayden. Also, “Hayden interview,” Meet The Press, NBC, December 15, 2013 “Maclean stole immensely valuable. ..”—See Appendix A, Donald Maclean “Whistle blower Bradley Bi

s around the world were already starting to modify their actions in light of what Snowden disclosed. Communication sources dried up.” What heightened Morell’s concern about this loss of intelligence sources was the discovery a 26-page document on an ISIS computer in Syria indicating that the terrorist gro