Epstein Secrets

e merit of being true: that Bibi was coming under pressure to shift our budgetary priorities away from defense toward social and economic issues. But Panetta understood that my request for a delay meant we were at least considering military action. He also realized that if we did launch an attack, it was i

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011891 / BARAK / 135 Yet especially with my main points of contact in the administration — first Bob Gates and then his successor, Leon Panetta, as Secretary of Defense —our broadly shared views, mutual respect, and the strength of the US-Israeli alliance outweighed any of that. Neither they,

significant numbers of US troops would begin arriving. As we weighed our final decision, I held a series of high-level meetings in Washington: with Panetta, national security adviser Tom Donilon, Hillary Clinton, and President Obama himself. Though not explicitly saying we were ready to attack, I left no

that we had to be prepared to take military action if there was no alternative way to rein in the Iranians. Ashkenazi’s successor as chief-of-staff, Benny Gantz, had signed off on the attack plan. While the Iranians were getting ever closer to nuclear-weapons capability, the strike force that we were assembli

e merit of being true: that Bibi was coming under pressure to shift our budgetary priorities away from defense toward social and economic issues. But Panetta understood that my request for a delay meant we were at least considering military action. He also realized that if we did launch an attack, it was i

HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028268 / BARAK / 135 Yet especially with my main points of contact in the administration - first Bob Gates and then his successor, Leon Panetta, as Secretary of Defense - our broadly shared views, mutual respect, and the strength of the US-Israeli alliance outweighed any of that. Neither they

n significant numbers of US troops would begin arriving. As we weighed our final decision, I held a series of high-level meetings in Washington: with Panetta, national security adviser Tom Donilon, Hillary Clinton, and President Obama himself. Though not explicitly saying we were ready to attack, I left no

that we had to be prepared to take military action if there was no alternative way to rein in the Iranians. Ashkenazi's successor as chief-of-staff, Benny Gantz, had signed off on the attack plan. While the Iranians were getting ever closer to nuclear-weapons capability, the strike force that we were assembli

that time, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, CIA Director David Petraeus, Joint Chi=fs Chairman Martin Dempsey, and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. His las=-minute decision in August 2013 not to strike Syria after its use of chemi=al weapons was popular in the Pentagon and with the public, but

y defined, are being stretched and possibly erased. "This entire s=stem is disintegrating like a house of cards that starts to collapse,"= Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz said. The Obama administr=tion signaled it is preparing to re-engage militarily in Iraq, a remarkabl= U-turn for a president who campaigned in 2008