Epstein Secrets

y of Fear (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977), in which I explored intelligence failures of domestic intelligence in the war on drugs. 5 extradite Trent Martin: The FBI press statement on this case was released on March 27, 2013, less than two months before Snowden bought his ticket for Hong Kong: https://ww

. Unlike the telephone program that Snowden revealed, the PRISM program produced actionable intelligence until the time when Snowden blew it. General Hayden, who was NSA director during the three years following the 9/11 attack, wrote that these surveil- lance powers, among other things, “uncovered illici

S law since Hong Kong had an active extradition treaty with the United States. Just a few months earlier, Hong Kong had made headlines by extraditing Trent Martin, a fugitive wanted in America for insider-trading, who was arrested in Hong Kong following an American request to detain him. Martin was then sent ba

e-piping.” One result was that the NSANet, which Snowden had access to at Dell in 2012, became a shared network. It had common access points. General Hayden described them to me as the equivalent of “reading rooms” in a library. They served as a means for NSA workers to exchange ideas about the problems t

f domestic intelligence in the war on drugs; and James Jesus Angleton: Was He Right (Fast Track Press/EJE Publications, New York 2011). “extraditing Trent Martin ...”—The FBI press statement on this case was released March 27, 2013, less than two months before Snowden bought his ticket for Hong Kong. https://w

RSIGHT_020405 254 10. CHAPTER FIFTEEN Did Snowden Act Alone? > “Totality of Snowden’s Actions,”— Author’s interview with Michael Hayden. Also, “Hayden interview,” Meet The Press, NBC, December 15, 2013 “Maclean stole immensely valuable. ..”—See Appendix A, Donald Maclean “Whistle blower Bradley Bi