Epstein Secrets

h Russia. He was put in contact with Anatoly Grigorievich Kucherena, a silver-haired 53-year old lawyer, who was known as a personal friend of Putin. Kucherena also did task for Putin’s party in the Russian parliament or Duma. Most important for Snowden, Kucherena had excellent connections in the Russian sec

who was known as a personal friend of Putin. Kucherena also did task for Putin’s party in the Russian parliament or Duma. Most important for Snowden, Kucherena had excellent connections in the Russian security apparatus since he served on the oversight committee of the FSB. He also offered to serve as the la

ernet appearance at well-attended events around the world, such as South by Southwest, TED, and other Internet conferences. Snowden was, according to Kucherena, was also furnished with bodyguards. To help earn his keep, he was employed at an unidentified Moscow cyber-security firm. To complete his resettleme

ly mean such a mole does not exist. Historically, we have many notable cases in which Russian moles eluded intensive investigations for many decades. Robert Hanssen served as a KGB penetration in the FBI for over 20 years without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames, acted as a KGB mole in the CIA for more than

asked other countries for asylum.” Kucherena said that otherwise he could not represent him. Snowden agreed to that condition. Later that afternoon Kucherena accompanied Snowden to area G9 in the transit zone where they emerged from a door marked “authorized personnel only” shortly before 5 PM. The room wa

gn journalist, had ever obtained an interview with Snowden. At this point, Zamir was becoming increasingly doubtful about getting my access to either Kucherena or Snowden. But I had another contact in Moscow. When I had been investigating the 2006 Polonitum poisoning of ex-KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko i

to New York was in five days. My fixer, Zamir, had been trying to arrange an appointment for three weeks but he had only received one call back from Kucherena’s assistant, Valentina Vladimirovna Kvirvova. She wanted to know how I knew Oliver Stone. He told her of my part in Stone’s movie Wall Street 2: Mone

on the NSA payroll in May 2013. If he intended to damage the NSA’s ability to monitor unsuspecting individuals abroad, he clearly succeeded. Just as Robert Hanssen had compromised the NSA’s interception of communication at the Soviet Embassy in the 1990s, Snowden compromised the NSA’s interception of Jihadist ta

Curry, “Ex-intelligence Expert Guilty of Espionage,” Chicago Tribune, June 6, 1986. CHAPTER 26 The Handler 261 “As for [Snowden’s] communication”: Kucherena interview, Shevardnadze, “Snowden Believes He Did Everything Right.” 261 learned from a Russian researcher: Vassili Sonkine, interview with author.

r NSA Director: ‘I Would Lose All Respect for Russia if They Haven't Fully Exploited Snowden,” VentureBeat, May 23, 2014. 166 He was put in contact: Kucherena, interview with Der Spiegel, “Snowden’s Law- yer: ‘Russia Will Not Hand Him Over’” Spiegel Online International, Jane 24, 2013. 166 “Officially, he

are sent over the Internet. He told Greenwald, for example, that encryption was “critically necessary” for anyone to evade NSA surveillance. Just as Robert Hanssen had deliberately compromised the NSA’s interception of Soviet communications in Washington, D.C., in the 1990s, Snowden deliberately compromised the

the journalists with the lists of sources that were particularly relevant to the NSA’s surveillance of Russia. His legal represen- tative in Moscow, Kucherena, confirmed that Snowden had taken secret “material” to Russia and had access to NSA documents that @ he had not given to journalists. Those unreveal

be used to motivate someone to “act alone” in gathering espionage material. I next turned to an even more important KGB coup with Cher- kashin: the Robert Hanssen case. From the KGB’s perspective, Hans- sen was an extraordinary espionage source. He was a walk-in who @ never entered the Soviet embassy or met wi