Epstein Secrets

h Russia. He was put in contact with Anatoly Grigorievich Kucherena, a silver-haired 53-year old lawyer, who was known as a personal friend of Putin. Kucherena also did task for Putin’s party in the Russian parliament or Duma. Most important for Snowden, Kucherena had excellent connections in the Russian sec

who was known as a personal friend of Putin. Kucherena also did task for Putin’s party in the Russian parliament or Duma. Most important for Snowden, Kucherena had excellent connections in the Russian security apparatus since he served on the oversight committee of the FSB. He also offered to serve as the la

ernet appearance at well-attended events around the world, such as South by Southwest, TED, and other Internet conferences. Snowden was, according to Kucherena, was also furnished with bodyguards. To help earn his keep, he was employed at an unidentified Moscow cyber-security firm. To complete his resettleme

eper program through Poteyev soon after it began. The issue was how to exploit this knowledge. When I was writing my book on international deception, Angleton had pointed out to me that “the business of intelligence services is understanding precisely the relationship of their opposition to them.” His view,

final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence coup, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept the Russian or Chinese intelligence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self-described “single point of failure,”

s of undelivered NSA documents found in his home, the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was murdered the KGB, in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death, to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.) The Rus

asked other countries for asylum.” Kucherena said that otherwise he could not represent him. Snowden agreed to that condition. Later that afternoon Kucherena accompanied Snowden to area G9 in the transit zone where they emerged from a door marked “authorized personnel only” shortly before 5 PM. The room wa

gn journalist, had ever obtained an interview with Snowden. At this point, Zamir was becoming increasingly doubtful about getting my access to either Kucherena or Snowden. But I had another contact in Moscow. When I had been investigating the 2006 Polonitum poisoning of ex-KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko i

to New York was in five days. My fixer, Zamir, had been trying to arrange an appointment for three weeks but he had only received one call back from Kucherena’s assistant, Valentina Vladimirovna Kvirvova. She wanted to know how I knew Oliver Stone. He told her of my part in Stone’s movie Wall Street 2: Mone

to life imprisonment. Looking at his watch, Cherkashin politely excused himself, saying he had work to do. On parting, I signed a copy of my book on Angleton for him and thanked him for his insights. Through the eyes of the KGB, a penetration of American intelligence was clearly opportunistic. If these pr

Spy Case.” October 31,2011, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/201 1/october/russian_103111/russian_10311 1 > Author's interview with James Jesus “Angleton had pointed out...’ Angleton. “The situation suddenly changed...”-- Bill Gertz, “Counterspies hunt Russian mole inside National Security Agency,” Wa

the journalists with the lists of sources that were particularly relevant to the NSA’s surveillance of Russia. His legal represen- tative in Moscow, Kucherena, confirmed that Snowden had taken secret “material” to Russia and had access to NSA documents that @ he had not given to journalists. Those unreveal

e entirely hidden, is kept veiled, as far as is possible, to increase the value of the coup. “The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli- gence service

“The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli- gence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self- described “single point of failur

of undelivered NSA documents found in his home, @ the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was mur- dered by the KGB in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death, to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.) The

Curry, “Ex-intelligence Expert Guilty of Espionage,” Chicago Tribune, June 6, 1986. CHAPTER 26 The Handler 261 “As for [Snowden’s] communication”: Kucherena interview, Shevardnadze, “Snowden Believes He Did Everything Right.” 261 learned from a Russian researcher: Vassili Sonkine, interview with author.

r NSA Director: ‘I Would Lose All Respect for Russia if They Haven't Fully Exploited Snowden,” VentureBeat, May 23, 2014. 166 He was put in contact: Kucherena, interview with Der Spiegel, “Snowden’s Law- yer: ‘Russia Will Not Hand Him Over’” Spiegel Online International, Jane 24, 2013. 166 “Officially, he

94), xxii. @ 186 The CIA learned of this: Former NSA official who requested anonymity, inter- view with author. 187 “the business of intelligence”: Angleton, interview with author. 187 preparing these “Americans”: FBI, “Operation Ghost Stories: Inside the Rus- sian Spy Case,” Oct. 31, 2011, https://www.f

tates v. Har- old J. Nicholson,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm /ciaspy/affidavt.htm. 223 When it comes to recruiting moles: Angleton, interviews with author. 224 well experienced with false flags: Epstein, Deception, 22-28. 224 the “Trust” deception: Ibid. Also, Raymond Rocca (th