Epstein Secrets

ournal. Snowden was certainly aware that he would soon be the object of a manhunt that could involve those with whom he was acquainted. He instructed Poitras to mask their e-mail communications in cyber- space “so we don’t have a clue or record of your true name in your file communication chain.” Such prec

eedoms. Within hours of the release of that video on the Guardian website, Snowden was known throughout the world as a courageous whistle-blower. In Laura Poitras’s remarks in accepting her Academy Award for Citizenfour on February 22, 2015, she said that Snowden acted as a whistle-blower not only to “expose a th

nterview with Kucherena was a coup because, until then, he had not discussed Snowden in a television interview. About halfway through the interview, Shevardnadze brought up the highly sensitive subject of the disposition of the NSA docu- ments. If anyone was in a position to know about these documents, it was

h as putting their cell phones in refrigerators, remain visible to a sophisticated intelligence service such as the SVR. All the defensive tactics of Laura Poitras, including PGP encryption, Tor software, and air-gapped computers (computers that have never been connected to the Internet), did not keep secrets ab

rets about her sources entirely to herself. Snowden, at a time when he was stealing NSA secrets in February 2013, went to great lengths to impress on Poitras the need for operational security about his contacts with her, but that injunction did not prevent her from telling at least five people about her so

sitive for journalists. So I wanted to find out from Kucherena which documents Snowden had taken to Russia. I went about it in a roundabout way. When Shevardnadze asked him about the secret material Snowden might reveal in Russia, Kucher- ena pointedly called her attention to Snowden’s CIA service, suggest- ing

vidently did not want to expose himself to prosecution or defect from the NSA. That was Snowden’s role. By accepting the sole blame in the video that Poitras made about him in Hong Kong, Snowden shielded anyone else from suspicion, which was, as he told Poitras, his purpose. Whoever helped him may still be

“Mini Documentary Reveals Full Extent of ‘Stellarwind’ Domestic Spy Program,” Infowars, Aug. 28, 2012. 62 Poitras had other impressive credentials: “Laura Poitras: Secret No Longer,” New School News, Aug. 14, 2013. 63 “I didn’t. You chose yourself”: Snowden’s e-mails to Poitras were extracted from her film Cit

nce Expert Guilty of Espionage,” Chicago Tribune, June 6, 1986. CHAPTER 26 The Handler 261 “As for [Snowden’s] communication”: Kucherena interview, Shevardnadze, “Snowden Believes He Did Everything Right.” 261 learned from a Russian researcher: Vassili Sonkine, interview with author. 261 When I had been inv

illance Under Obama.” Along with it was the FISA warrant to Verizon. The PRISM story broke hours later in the Washington Post. Written by Gellman and Poitras, it claimed that the NSA and FBI were tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S, Internet companies which were knowingly particip

ding such well known activists as Runa Sandvik (who he supplied his true name and address via email), Micah Lee, Jacob Appelbaum, Parker Higgins, and Laura Poitras. “It is not statistically improbable that members of this circle were being watched by a hostile service,” a former NSA counterintelligence officer t

efense was what Snowden did with the second set afer his meetings with the journalists in Hong Kong. Did he take these documents with him to Russia? Shevardnadze, who makes it a point to drill her interviewees, pressed Kucherena as to whether Snowden still had these NSA files, or “material” in Russia. The dial

ining. His motive was not money, as it was a lower- paying position. At the time, he made this choice he had already set up an encrypted channel with Laura Poitras for the purpose of sending her secret material. But he did not have to change jobs to send her secrets. So what was his purpose in making this fatefu

hed, before switching jobs Snowden had already taken most of the documents pertaining to the NSA’s domestic operations that he could have supplied to Poitras and Greenwald for whistle-blowing purposes. Indeed, while still at Dell, it will be recalled, he had he had told Poitras he had a copy of Presidentia

sitive for journalists. So I sought to find out from Kucherena which documents Snowden had taken to Russia. I went about it in a roundabout way. When Shevardnadze asked him about the secret material Snowden had might reveal in Russia, Kucherena pointedly called her attention to Snowden’s CIA service, suggesting

one’s 2016 movie, “Snowden,” is demonstrably false. This narrative began soon after Mr. Snowden arrived in Hong Kong, where he arranged to meet with Laura Poitras, a Berlin-based documentary filmmaker, and Glenn Greenwald, a Brazil-based blogger for the Guardian. Both journalists were longtime critics of NSA su

en Mr. Snowden and HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019208 --- PAGE BREAK --- Russian authorities. On Sept. 23, 2013, Mr. Kucherena gave a long interview to Sophie Shevardnadze, a journalist for Russia Today television. When Ms. Shevardnadze directly asked him if Mr. Snowden had given all the documents he had taken from the