Epstein Secrets

ed by the existence of independent Azerbaijan, despite the fact that its own Azeris — a fifth to a quarter of all Iranians including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (who is half-Azeri) — are generally well integrated. Baku has for its part accused Iran of supporting radical Shiite elements, including the now ou

ged as collateral. This would be of little consolation to Israeli strategists if not for parallel listening posts widely believed to exist in Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkmenistan and even elsewhere in coordination with the United States But more importantly, this also means that a conflict with Iran may be muc

he domestic challenge presented by the protest movement of millions of Iranian demonstrators in 2009. The recent pronouncements from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other Iranian officials should be taken seriously. In November, Khamenei said: "Iran is not a nation to sit still and just observe threats from

ionally been concentrated in regions in the south. There would also be a strong temptation on the part of the country's Kurds to carve out a Syrian Kurdistan in the northeast. And unlike in Libya, where any negative consequences from the overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi could be minimized in terms of the imp

he domestic challenge presented by the protest movement of millions of Iranian demonstrators in 2009. The recent pronouncements from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other Iranian officials should be taken seriously. In November, Khamenei said: "Iran is not a nation to sit still and just observe threats fro

ons in the EFTA_R1_00228282 EFTA01841746 south. There would also be a strong temptation on the part of the country's Kurds to carve out a Syrian Kurdistan in the northeast. And unlike in Libya, where any negative consequences from the overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi could be minimized in terms of the im

but in the end they will comply with U.S. prohibitions. Some have suggested that the essential "red lines" of Iran's supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, must be taken into consideration as they are unlikely to be adjusted. Western negotiators would be wise not to insist that Iran ship out its stock

action. Erdogan managed to portray his recent trip to Brussels as a great success story. The ongoing but stagnant peace process with the insurgent Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) also provides him an important lifeline. The PKK remains quiet, keeps the ceasefire reached a year ago, and its jailed leader

he kind of journalistic saber rattling that was visible on last week's cover of The Weekly Standard, which showed a photo of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, under the headline: "The Most Dangerous Man in the World." America's most dangerous threat is thousands of miles from that man. And the United St

ightmare scenario for the Turkish establishment and for nationalist Turks in particular. The fear is this will pave, in time, the way to a "Greater Kurdistan" that will also incorporate much of Southeast Anatolia. Given that separatist terrorism by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has peaked since spri

d by the existence of independent Azerbaijan, despite the fact that its own Azeris — a fifth to a quarter of all Iranians including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (who is half-Azeri) — are generally well integrated. Baku has for its part accused Iran of supporting radical Shiite elements, including the now ou

ged as collateral. This would be of little consolation to Israeli strategists if not for parallel listening posts widely believed to exist in Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkmenistan and even elsewhere in coordination with the United States But more importantly, this also means that a conflict with Iran may be muc