Epstein Secrets

ncerned with an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), not with the Perlman exception to the final judgment rule; indeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those two distinctions are critical. In analyzing the issue of

lack of awareness that Perlman had ever been applied outside the grand jury context, Opposition at 6, but a quick Westlaw search demonstrates that Penman has often been applied outside the grand jury context. See, e.g., Gotham Holdings, LP v. 7 EFTA00583460 D. The United States is a Disinterested

ar. Co., 244 F.2d 158, 162 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1955), a civil case. In just the few years since Mohawk, the Fourth Circuit found jurisdiction based on Penman in a civil case, Mezu v. Morgan State University, 495 Fed. Appx. 286, 289 (4th Cir. 2012); the Ninth Circuit has applied Perlman in a case arising u

his Interlocutory Appeal. The victims argue that we should dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction for two reasons. First, they argue that the Perlman doctrine, which permits a claimant of a privilege to appeal a non-final judgment, applies only to grand jury subpoenas. Perlman' United States, 247

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

his Interlocutory Appeal. The victims argue that we should dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction for two reasons. First, they argue that the Perlman doctrine, which permits a claimant of a privilege to appeal a non-final judgment, applies only to grand jury subpoenas. Perlman' United States, 247

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

ircuit decision that an attorney-client rivilege order is not immediately appealable). As you probably know, Epstein plans to rely in United States' Perlman as the basis for an interlocutory appeal. Our understanding is that the Justice Department has long sought to give a narrow construction to Perlman.

hat the Justice Department in other Courts of Appeals outside the Eleventh Circuit has argued that Mohawk implicitly narrows Perlman substantially. Penman is most commonly used by criminals who are targets of federal grand jury investigations, who seek to thwart and delay the Justice Department's inves

his Interlocutory Appeal. The victims argue that we should dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction for two reasons. First, they argue that the Perlman doctrine, which permits a claimant of a privilege to appeal a non-final judgment, applies only to grand jury subpoenas. Perlman' United States, 247

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E