Epstein Secrets

int which consists of conclusory allegations unsupported by fac- tual assertions fails even on the liberal standard of Rule 12(b)(6)." De Jesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 87 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir.1996). This Court, like Judge Robertson before it, has found no basis for a bank's liability for injuries funded by money

0 (hereinafter "Supp. Al-Wohai- bi Aff."). a. Status of the PIF In Filler v. Hanvit Bank, a case with facts very similar to those presented here, the Second Circuit reiterated Dole Food's requirement of direct ownership for instru- mentality status. Two defendants were commercial banks majority-owned by the Ko

t of the Princes’ ac- tions. [22-24] Pursuant to the Second Cir- cuit’s instruction, the Court must first de- termine whe

very least, discovery should be ordered circumspectly and only to verify allega- tions of specific facts crucial to an immuni- ty determination.”)). The Second Circuit has instructed “that generally a plaintiff may be allowed limited discovery with re- spect to the jurisdictional issue; but until [plaintiff] has sho

plaint which consists of conclusory allegations unsupported by fac- tual assertions fails even on the liberal standard of Rule 12(b)(6).” De Jesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 87 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir.1996). This Court, like Judge Robertson before it, has found no basis for a bank’s liability for injuries funded by money pas

26 In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2008) 15 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) 19 N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) 26 Nat'l Res. Del Council v. United States Ening. Prot. Agency, 954 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020) 26 Standefer v. United States,

on. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2001). Evidence is "material" in this sense only if "its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial." United States v. Bagley, 473

material." United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing cases). With regard to the timing of disclosing material under Giglio, the Second Circuit, in Coppa, rejected the argument that such material should be disclosed when defendants make a 7 EFTA00027318 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:19-cr-0

26 In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2008) 15 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) 19 N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) 26 Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 954 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020) 26 Standefer v. United States,

on. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2001). Evidence is "material" in this sense only if "its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial." United States v. Bagley, 473

material." United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing cases). With regard to the timing of disclosing material under Giglio, the Second Circuit, in Coppa, rejected the argument that such material should be disclosed when defendants make a 7 EFTA00031274 --- PAGE BREAK --- demand for it.