Epstein Secrets

422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States'. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (I I* Cir. 2004), judgment vacated for Booker consideration, 115 S. Ct. 1338 (2006); United Stalest Grego, 363 F.3d 1093 (II* Cir. 2004); United States'. Miranda, 348 F.3d 1322 (I I lb Cir. 200

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States Murrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Murrell court wrote that, under the "plain language"

§2422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (II d' C' . 2004),judgment vacated for Booker consideration, 1 S. Ct. 338 (2006); United States Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2004); United States Miranda, 348 F.3d 1322 (II* Cir. 2 3); Uni

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States, Murrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Murrell court wrote that, under the "plain language

er §2422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (11ih 2004), judgment vacated for Booker consideration, 12, S. Ct. 1338 (2006); United States' Orrega, 363 F.3ds1093 (11th Cir. 2004); United States Miranda, 348 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2003)

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's' decision in United States Murrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Murrell court wrote that, under the "plain language"

2422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (11 th Cir. 2004), judgment vacated for Booker consideration, 125 S. Ct. 338 (2006); United States !Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093 (I I" Cir. 2004); United States "'Miranda, 348 17.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 20

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in eases whcre there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States Murrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Murrell court wrote that, under the "plain language"

422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (I Is Cir. 2004),judgment vacated for Booker consideration, 125 S. Ct. 1338 (2006); United States v. Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Miranda, 348 F.3d 1322 (I 1* Cir.

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Muriel!, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Mum!! court wrote that, under the "plain language

2422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2004),judgment varied for Booker consideration, 125 S. Ct. 1338 (2006); United States v. Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Miranda, 348 F.3d 1322 (11° Cir. 2

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Murrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Mini! court wrote that, under the "plain language

§2424(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States !Morton, 364 I3d 1300 (I l ° Cij. 2004),judgnwru vacated for Booker consideration, 125 S. Ct. 338 006); United States I Orrega, 363 I3d 1093 (116 Cir. 2004); United States91 Miranda, 348 I3d 1322 (II6 Cirj003); Unit

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States Murrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Murrell court wrote that, under the "plain language"