Epstein Secrets

t considered red lines in the past." The timing of Hamas's outreach may have something to do with the US-led peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, says Talal Okal, a political analyst in Gaza. If a peace agreement is reached when Hamas and Fatah are cooperating, Hamas is more likely to share

"heroic flexibility." And while the outcome of the election was greeted with joyous celebrations in the streets, Rouhani has powerful enemies, the Revolutionary Guard among them, who have made no secret of their hope that he will fail. He has to deliver results reasonably soon, or he will be ousted. His first st

ns with America's closest ally in the region and achieved nothing whatsoever in the "peace process." The end result in the summer of 2014 is to see the Palestinian Authority turn to a deal with Hamas for new elections that—if they are held, which admittedly is unlikely—would usher the terrorist group into a power- shari

wn the al Qaeda-linked groups. U.S. relations with traditional allies in the Gulf, Jordan, Israel and Egypt were very good. Iran was contained, its Revolutionary Guard forces at home. Today, terrorism has metastasized in Syria and Iraq, Jordan is at risk, the humanitarian toll is staggering, terrorist groups are g

overreach as contributing to Sunni radicalism, unity, and pushback. For instance, they see the recent entry of Hamas into a unity government with the Palestinian Authority as the loss of a strong, radical, but Sunni regional ally. And it doesn't stop there. As Saeed Leylaz, an Iranian analyst cited by the Journal, re

er is quietly moving to ensure that Iran doubles down on its current course. Recent press releases by the Fars News Agency, affiliated with Iran's Revolutionary Guard, have played up the Shiite religious obligation to fight in Iraq and shown video of what appears to be a recruitment drive. Meanwhile, Ithamenei's

amas is more likely to share the political gains and gain international acceptance. It could also partake in the windfall that donors have promised the Palestinian Authority if it signs a peace agreement. Hamas may also feel less popular pressure to campaign for one of its founding principles: the liberation of Palesti

"heroic flexibility." And while the outcome of the election was greeted with joyous celebrations in the streets, Rouhani has powerful enemies, the Revolutionary Guard among them, who EFTA_R1_02206869 EFTA02722173 have made no secret of their hope that he will fail. He has to deliver results reasonably soon, or

ompromises, and overcoming resistance by Hamas and other terrorists. Without such institutions, no long-term solution is possible. Negotiating with the Palestinian Authority has less substance than negotiating with a hologram. Perversely, however, Obama treats Israel as the problem. Not apprehending these realities or

receive only $4.8bn of its $100bn in frozen accounts in foreign banks. Others, like Javad Karimi Ghoddoosi, a hardline Majles deputy and a retired Revolutionary Guard officer, have claimed that Khamenei feels the Accord does not guarantee Iran's right to enrich uranium. To control these hardliners, Rouhani has no

Palestinian confederation that would encompass both banks of the Jordan River. Majali even discussed his plan with political figures in Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with the tacit approval of King Abdullah. The plan stirred a heated debate in Jordan, leading Abdullah to believe that it was still too sensitive;

rder who was given leeway by the regime's powers that be. He couldn't defy the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, or run afoul of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. The case is now being made that Rohani is no freelancer, that he is a player of standing in the regime, and that the olive branch he carries with