Epstein Secrets

honor agreement to be announced in the near future. Participants to the agreement include Islamist factions in Ain el-Hilweh, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Authority, the Amal Movement, and apparently Hezbollah and the LAF. While the commitments of Hezbollah and the LAF remain unclear and hypothetical, the Pales

February, Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid al-Attiyah visited Tehran for that purpose. The source added that last week, Iran gave the green light for Meshaal's visit after contacts between Zahar and Marwan Issa, a senior leader in the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' armed wing. This long overdue v

financial support, as it signaled that there is no veto on the movement by decision-making circles in Tehran. Furthermore, Hamas is optimistic that Meshaal's visit will result in increasing Iran's financial support. The latter was confirmed by Ahmed Youssef, a former political adviser to Palestinian l

ilateral relationship. Al-Monitor has learned from a source close to Hamas' political leadership that Iran is also planning to receive Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal soon, after a long tug of war marked by undisclosed shuttle discussions. The source said that Qatar was mediating with Iran to restore ties with Ha

s between Zahar and Marwan Issa, a senior leader in the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' armed wing. This long overdue visit will culminate in Meshaal meeting with Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In his meeting with Meshaal and in his recent and first visit to Qatar, Islamic Jihad S

nto a bitter public feud. It was prompted an agreement reached last week in Qatar between the head of Hamas' political bureau, Khaled Meshaal, and the Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas. According to the deal, Abbas would take on the additional role of prime minister until elections are held later this year

e of a possible Israeli or American attack on its nuclear facilities. How the crisis in Hamas develops depends on several factors. A close ally of Meshaal, Ahmed Youssef, has implied that Qatar promised strong financial backing in return for the agreement. If that is delivered, especially if it is aug

Hamas has exploded into a bitter public feud. It was prompted an agreement reached last week in Qatar between the head of Hamas' political bureau, Khaled Meshaal, and the Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas. According to the deal, Abbas would take on the additional role of prime minister until el

prisings, the divergence of interests between Hamas' leadership in Gaza and its leadership abroad has been steadily intensifying. External leaders, Meshaal in particular, have come under increasing pressure to adapt to regional transformations, particularly the growing sectarian split in the Middle Ea

be crucial. Its leaders, Ahmed Jabari and Marwan Issa, have traditionally deferred to the leadership of the political bureau, and reportedly urged Meshaal not to step down as its chief. But they have also expressed dismay at some of Meshaal's recent comments regarding the tactical value of nonviolent

k and East Jerusalem in the Six-Day War. Today, Israel draws a distinction between West Bank settlements and areas of Jerusalem built after 1967 -- the Palestinian Authority does not. (The label "East Jerusalem" can be misleading. It is generally applied to any land beyond the meandering pre-1967 Green Line, even if it

e Brotherhood mainstream for Hamas may be embracing its terms, seeking political rather than military strategies to advance the Palestinian cause. Meshaal has certainly made a number of statements hinting at a shift away from arms towards "popular resistance," although such matters are likely to be a

Iran — and with it the end of any illusion Tehran might have harbored of exerting influence in the new revolutionary Arab mainstream. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal is now ensconced in Qatar's capital, Doha, while deputy leader Moussa Abu Marzouk has set up shop in Cairo. And Hamas leaders used last Friday's m

k and East Jerusalem in the Six- Day War. Today, Israel draws a distinction between West Bank settlements and areas of Jerusalem built after 1967 -- the Palestinian Authority does not. (The label "East Jerusalem" can be misleading. It is generally applied to any land beyond the meandering pre-1967 Green Line, even if it

Iran — and with it the end of any illusion Tehran might have harbored of exerting influence in the new revolutionary Arab mainstream. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal is now ensconced in Qatar's capital, Doha, while deputy leader Moussa Abu Marzouk has set up shop in Cairo. And Hamas leaders used last Friday's mi

he Brotherhood mainstream for Hamas may be embracing its terms, seeking political rather than military strategies to advance the Palestinian cause. Meshaal has certainly made a number of statements hinting at a shift away from arms towards "popular resistance," although such matters are likely to be a

, the Palestinians have only one diplomatic card left — their status at the United Nations — and once again they are trying to play it. Last year, the Palestinian Authority toyed with submitting an application for full United Nations membership, but backed off in the face of overwhelming opposition from the United Stat

resh elections, neither event has materialized, while the rivalry has resumed. Those in Hamas who favored making peace with Abbas, led by chairman Khaled Meshaal, lost out to those in Hamas who argued to remain on their own, not least because the Arab Spring is delivering governments into the hands of politi

how the rulings will affect the newly elected parliament. Palestinians: Palestinian Authority President Abbas ordered an official name change from the Palestinian Authority to the "State of Palestine" on January 6th, the latest of several decisions to boost the standing of the Palestinian people following the UN vote o

ials claimed half a million supporters turned out, while Hamas put estimates at 200,000. In another apparent step toward reconciliation, Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal and Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas met in Cairo on January 9th—the first such meeting in almost a year. Though this is the latest indication of a Palest

amallah, stronghold of an insolvent and sclerotic Palestinian Authority, feels distant in more senses than one. Rawabi r

ings here, although a bright red sign at the junction reminds one category of motorist not to feel too complacent. "This road leads to Area 'A' Under the Palestinian Authority," it reads in Arabic, Hebrew, and broken English. "The entrance for Israeli citizens 1s forbidden, dangerous to your lives and is against the Israeli

he political or security situation seriously deteriorates - - if the checkpoints return, if the Israelis are forced to re-occupy urban areas ceded to the Palestinian Authority under the Oslo Accords, as happened during the Second Intifada; if Hamas wages a violent takeover of the Palestinian government -- all bets are off.

amallah, stronghold of an insolvent and sclerotic Palestinian Authority, feels distant in more senses than one. Rawabi re

ings here, although a bright red sign at the junction reminds one category of motorist not to feel too complacent. "This road leads to Area 'A' Under the Palestinian Authority," it reads in Arabic, Hebrew, and broken English. "The entrance for Israeli citizens is forbidden, dangerous to your lives and is against the Israeli

he political or security situation seriously deteriorates - - if the checkpoints return, if the Israelis are forced to re-occupy urban areas ceded to the Palestinian Authority under the Oslo Accords, as happened during the Second Intifada; if Hamas wages a violent takeover of the Palestinian government -- all bets are off.

21 January 1997 TIPH II agreement. 21 January 1997 Israel-Jordan QIZ agreement. 25 September 1997 _ Israel’s assassination attempt on Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Amman. 23 October 1998 Wye River Agreement signed by Arafat and Netanyahu. 14 December 1998 The Palestinian National Council convenes in the pre

sident made further US involvement in peace negotiations contingent upon Arafat’s removal from power, and the implementation of democratic reforms in the Palestinian Authority’s political structure. This was consist- ent with Prime Minister Sharon’s policies. At this time, parts of the Palestinian leadership either passively