Epstein Secrets

ould not preclude she would not consult with others about the offer he was making her. Since her current documentary project included interviews with Assange, Appelbaum and three ex-NSA executives, intelligence services with sophisticated surveillance capabilities might also have taken a professional inter

ized release of communications intelligence documents could violate US espionage laws. Even so, there was no shortage of activists overseas, such as Assange, who would be willing to publish NSA documents revealing its global surveillance activities. And in answer to his rhetorical question, he no doubt kn

er HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020154 Chapter Ten Raider of the Inner Sanctum Chapter Eleven Escape Artist Chapter Twelve Whistle Blower Chapter Thirteen Enter Assange Chapter Fourteen Fugitive PART THREE The Counterintelligence Conundrum Chapter Fifteen Did Snowden Act Alone Chapter Sixteen The Question of When C

e-piping.” One result was that the NSANet, which Snowden had access to at Dell in 2012, became a shared network. It had common access points. General Hayden described them to me as the equivalent of “reading rooms” in a library. They served as a means for NSA workers to exchange ideas about the problems t

h one of his senior staff members to help him engineer his escape to Russia. That senior staff member was Sarah Harrison, After speaking to Snowden, Assange called Harrison, who was in Melbourne, Australia. She had gone there a month earlier to help organize Assange’s somewhat quixotic election campaign f

nwhile, Snowden was organizing his own exit from Hong Kong. He placed a call to Julian Assange. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020256 105 CHAPTER THIRTEEN Enter Assange “Thanks to Russia (and thanks to WikiLeaks), Snowden remains free.” — Julian Assange Born on July 3, 1971 in Queensland, Australia, Julian Assange h

and they are very grateful” American intelligence officers knowledgeable about the operations of the FSB, agreed with Kalugin’s assessment. General Hayden, for example, who served both as director of the NSA, CIA, and Air Force counterintelligence, told me in an interview that he saw no other possibilit

ardian, January 30, 2011 “Sarah Harrison, his comely...”—Sarah Ellison, “The man who came to dinner,” Vanity Fair, October 2013 “Snowden telephoned Assange...”-- Assange interview in (London) Sunday Times. Giles Whittell, “Julian Assange unmasked.” Times Magazine, August 29, 2015. Also, “Snowden told me

en had been held virtually incommunicado for 20 days. Other than Russian officials, the only person he had been allowed to see during this period was Assange’s aide, Sarah Harrison. “Where in the airport did you meet him?” I asked. Was it in a VIP lounge?” “Tt was in the transit zone,” he replied coyly.

RSIGHT_020405 254 10. CHAPTER FIFTEEN Did Snowden Act Alone? > “Totality of Snowden’s Actions,”— Author’s interview with Michael Hayden. Also, “Hayden interview,” Meet The Press, NBC, December 15, 2013 “Maclean stole immensely valuable. ..”—See Appendix A, Donald Maclean “Whistle blower Bradley Bi

nterview with Katrina vanden Heuvel, the editor of The Nation, in 2014. He had already discussed the likelihood of his being captured in Ecuador with Assange before his departure for Moscow. He later told Alan Rusbridger, the editor of The Guardian, that he considered himself at risk in Latin America. So w

arfare, conventional defensive rules do not apply. “There are no rivers or hills up here. It’s all flat. All advantage goes to the attacker,” General Hayden said in an inter- view in 2015 with the publisher of The Wall Street Journal. His point was that because there are no defensive positions, the United

rmation War” Guardian, Jan. 30, 2011. 99 Sarah Harrison: Sarah Ellison, “The Man Who Came to Dinner,” Vanity Fair, Oct. 2013. 99 Snowden telephoned Assange: Assange interview, in Giles Whittell, “Julian Assange Unmasked,” Sunday Times (London), Aug. 29, 2015. 99 “Snowden told me they had abused Manning”

. Unlike the telephone program that Snowden revealed, the PRISM program produced actionable intelligence until the time when Snowden blew it. General Hayden, who was NSA director during the three years following the 9/11 attack, wrote that these surveil- lance powers, among other things, “uncovered illici